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Abstract 
 
We compute new measures of religious diversity and intolerance and study their effects on civil 
conflict. Using a religion tree that describes the relationship between different religions, we 
compute measures of religious diversity at three different levels of aggregation. We find that 
religious diversity is a significant and robust correlate of civil conflict. While religious 
fractionalization significantly reduces conflict, religious polarization increases it. This is most robust 
at the second level of aggregation which implies that the cleavage between Hindus, Muslims, Jews, 
and Christians etc. is more relevant than that between either subgroups of religions like Protestants 
and Catholics, Shias and Sunnis, etc. or that between higher levels of aggregation like Abrahamic 
and Indian religions. We find religious intolerance to be a significant and robust predictor of conflict. 
Ethnic polarization ceases to be a robust predictor of civil conflict once we control for religious 
diversity and intolerance. We find no evidence that some religions are more violent than others. 
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1 Introduction
Does religious diversity affect the probability of civil conflict? If we are to take seriously the
popular perception supported by the views of political scientists like Samuel Huntington then
the answer to this question should be in the affirmative. Huntington (1993a,1993b, 1998), in
his well-known Clash of Civilizations hypothesis, proposes that people’s cultural and religious
identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post-cold war period. Surprisingly, the
few studies that try to empirically answer this question suggest otherwise. We resolve this
apparent contradiction by improving on some of the major shortcomings of the existing empirical
literature. We argue that the groupings used so far in the literature to calculate religious
diversity are unsatisfactory. Moreover, we show that one cannot ignore religious intolerance
while investigating the effects of religious diversity on civil conflict. Using newly constructed
measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance we find that both religious diversity and
religious intolerance are important correlates of civil conflict.
Twenty per cent of all nations have experienced at least ten years of civil war during
the period 1960-2006 (Blattman and Miguel (2010)). Apart from the huge human costs, the
economic costs of conflict are also enormous. Hess (2003) finds that a lower bound estimate of
the average benefit from eliminating conflict is about 8 per cent of per capita annual consumption
for the average country. Thus, understanding the determinants of conflict is no doubt important.
In this paper we focus on the relevance of religious diversity and religious intolerance on civil
conflicts.
Empirically, there are numerous studies that have tried to pin down the relation between
ethnic diversity and civil conflict.2. However, most of these studies focus on ethno-linguistic
diversity and very few of them rigorously study the relation between religious diversity and
civil conflict. This is surprising since religion is an important aspect of ethnicity. “In virtually
every heterogeneous society, religious difference serves as a source of potential conflict” (Brahm
(2005)). Moreover, as Fox (1997) points out, conflicts such as the civil wars in Afghanistan,
the former Yugoslavia and the Sudan, the peace process in Israel and the conflict in Northern
Ireland are essentially all conflicts between ethnic groups of different religions.
The few papers that have actually controlled for religious diversity while investigating
the correlates of civil conflict have found it to be insignificant. Both Fearon and Laitin (2003),
2E.g. Fearon and Laitin (2003), Miguel et al. (2004), Collier (2001), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon (2005),
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).
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and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) find that religious diversity has no significant effect
on conflict once we control for other relevant variables. Fox (1997) finds that while religion
does play a role in some ethno-religious conflicts, it is important in only a minority of ethnic
conflicts.3 Fox (2004), on the other hand is the only paper that finds evidence in favour of relgion
being important for conflicts. He finds that not only can religion influence conflict, its influence
has been increasing. However, the accepted paradigm in this literature is that ethno-linguistic
diversity is relevant for civil conflicts while religious diversity is not.
There are several reasons why we revisit the relationship between religious diversity and
civil conflicts. First, the definition of religious groups used in the literature so far has been
highly unsatisfactory and unclear. Desmet et al. (2012) underscore the importance of properly
defining the ethno-linguistic groups used as primitives to construct the different measures of
heterogeneity. They demonstrate that the degree of coarseness of ethno-linguistic classifications
has profound implications for inference on the role of diversity. Studying the effects of ethno-
linguistic cleavages on civil conflict, redistribution, public goods and growth, they find that the
same cleavages do not affect all outcomes similarly. For example, they find that less aggregate
measures representing shallower cleavages matter more than more aggregate measures repre-
senting deeper cleavages for public good provision, whereas for civil conflicts deeper cleavages
are more relevant than shallower ones.
This leads us to the question on whether the no-effects result of religious diversity on
civil conflict is a consequence of the way in which religious diversity has been measured so far.
Religious diversity is always calculated using the currently existing religious sub-groups like
Protestants, Catholics, Shias and Sunnis etc. as the relevant groupings. However, it is hardly
obvious why these groupings should be more relevant than broader groupings of Christians,
Muslims and Hindus etc. Also, Christianity and Islam both share the same origin (Abraham),
whereas Hinduism is an Indian religion. Thus the difference between Hindus and Muslims might
arguably be more relevant than that between Christians and Muslims. Furthermore if there is
any truth in the Clash of Civilizations idea of Huntington (1993a,1993b, 1998), all sects of
Christianity belong to the same civilization, whereas Christianity and Islam clearly belong to
different civilizations. Thus, a conflict between the different sects of Christianity might be less
likely than that between Christians and Muslims. Theoretically, it is clear that there could be
differences in the diversity indices calculated using different group definitions but does it make
3Strictly speaking, Fox (1997) investigates whether religious issues are salient in conflict and not if religious
diversity can predict civil conflict.
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a difference empirically?
To illustrate our approach let us consider a comparison of two countries - India and
Switzerland. The religious composition of India is: Muslims -13.4%, Christians - 2.3%, Hindus-
80.5%, Sikhs -1.9%, other religions - 1.8% (including some other Indian religions like Buddhism,
Jainism etc.), and none - 0.1%. Switzerland’s religious composition is: Muslims - 4.3%, Chris-
tians - 78.5% (Roman Catholics- 41%, Protestants - 35.3%, Orthodox 1.8%, Other Christians -0.4
%), other religions - 1%, and none -15.4.%. Evidently Switzerland has high religious diversity
if we consider all the sub-sects of Christianity along with its 4.3% Muslim population. How-
ever, not only do all the sub-sects of Christianity share the same origins, Christianity and Islam
themselves are both Abrahamic religions and thus share the same origin. On the other hand, in
India, not only are the three biggest groups of Hindus, Muslims and Christians culturally more
dissimilar than the different denominations of Christianity that are present in Switzerland, but
more importantly, Hinduism and Sikhism on the one hand and Islam and Christianity on the
other hand represent completely different civilizations. Hinduism and Sikhism are both Indian
religions whereas Islam and Christianity originated from Abraham.
Not surprisingly, calculating religious polarization (fractionalization) for India at the level
of existing religious sub-groups or sects4 its ranking is 138 (139) which is quite low. However, as
soon as we move up levels of aggregation to take into account the origins/cultural similarity of
the religions, its ranking changes to 78 (70) at level 2, and to 57 (56) at level 1. Thus, from level
3 to level 2 its ranking moves up 60 places. India is a country which has indeed experienced
several violent riots between the Hindus and the Muslims right from the pre-independence period
to the present times. Looking at the diversity index calculated at the most disaggregated level,
India looks like a below average religiously diverse country. However, once we move up levels
it’s religiously diversity ranking is quite high. On the other hand if we look at Switzerland, it
is one of the most religiously diverse countries calculating diversity at the most disaggregated
level. Its religious polarization (fractionalization) ranking is 9 (76) at level 3. However once
we move up levels its religious polarization (fractionalization) ranking changes to 128 (128) at
level 2, and to 156 (156) at level 1. Switzerland is indeed one of the most peaceful countries
in the world. These are some examples that help us illustrate the importance of aggregating at
different levels.5 Whether this aggregation at different levels actually increases the explanatory
4This is what is done in all the existing studies that calculate religious diversity.
5More examples are provided in the data section and the entire list of country rankings according to the
different diversity indices is provided in the appendix Tables B.15 and B.16. Figures A.6 to A.11 map the
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power of religious diversity is of course an empirical question which we aim to answer in this
paper through rigorous analysis of the data.
Second, the issue of religious intolerance has been entirely ignored in the literature.
Since, religious intolerance could lead to both lower religious diversity and higher conflict, not
controlling for it would lead to meaningless results. Let us consider some illustrative exam-
ples. Afghanistan is one of the least religiously diverse countries in the world with 99% of the
population being Muslims. However, it is the 5th most intolerant country in our dataset. Not
surprisingly, it has faced years of violent domestic conflict. Moreover, religious intolerance might
itself directly lead to lower religious diversity but a higher probability of civil conflict. For ex-
ample, Pakistan is the third most intolerant country in our dataset. During its partition from
India and later on right through to the present day there has been a mass movement of Hindus
and Sikhs from Pakistan to India, leading to a fall in religious diversity.6 On the other hand
Pakistan has continuously experienced conflict throughout the years. Thus, without controlling
for intolerance Pakistan appears to be a not so diverse country with significant civil violence.
In order to correctly identify the effects of religious diversity on civil conflict we need to control
for religious intolerance. We thus argue that the finding that religious diversity is irrelevant
for conflict while ethno-linguistic diversity is important for it is as much a consequence of not
controlling for religious intolerance as it is for constructing religious diversity measures at an
erroneous level of aggregation.
Finally, we would like to verify whether some religions are more conflict-prone or peace-
loving than others. If so, it would lead to the conclusion that it is not religious diversity that
matters but some religions, by virtue of being more violent lead to more conflict. In other
words, we want to understand not only whether indeed civil conflicts stem from a Clash of
Civilizations, but also whether some civilizations are more prone to clashes. In the same vein
we would also like to verify if having more religious people in the population has any impact
on civil conflict. Previous research has found religious beliefs to have an effect on crime rates
Shariff and Rhemtulla (2012). Thus, it is interesting to test whether having more religious or
non-religious people in a country affects its probability of experiencing civil conflict.
We have several novel findings in this paper. First, we find that religious diversity has a
significant and robust correlation with both civil and ethnic conflict. Contrary to the findings
different diversity indices.
6Hindu refugees continue coming to India as recently as 2012: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/hindu-
refugees-from-pakistan-continue-to-reach-india/1/214086.html
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in the existing literature, religious diversity remains a significant correlate of conflict even after
controlling for ethno-linguistic diversity. Furthermore, the correlations between our measures
of religious diversity and the different measures of ethno-linguistic diversity are very low which
further ensures that we are not picking up the effects of ethno-linguistic diversity and that
religious diversity is an important correlate of civil conflict in its own right.7
We find that while religious fractionalization has significantly negative correlation with
conflict, religious polarization has a significantly positive correlation with it. Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol (2005) argue that a high number of different groups increase the coordination
problems and, therefore, given a level of polarization, the probability of civil wars may fall in
fractionalization. Moreover, we find that religious diversity, at the second level of aggregation is
the most robust correlate of conflict. The cleavage between Hindus, Muslims, and Christians etc.
is more relevant than that between Abrahamic and Indian religions or that between different
denominations of Christians - like Protestants and Catholics, or of Muslims - like Shias and
Sunnis. This result further indicates that aggregating the data at different levels is crucial.
Following Huntington’s hypothesis, Hinduism, Christianity and Islam all represent different
civilizations and that explains the potential for clash among them.
We also find that religious intolerance is a significant and robust predictor of civil conflict.
Since our measure of religious intolerance is composed of several components we investigate
which specific aspects of intolerance are more important than others. We find that intolerance
arising out of social and government regulation of religion significantly lead to more conflict.
Government favouritism on the other hand is not a significant predictor of conflict. This is not
surprising since social and government regulation of religion are arguably related to the more
fundamental right of freedom to worship or to practice a religion of one’s own choice.
Finally, we find no evidence in favour of the popular perception that some religions
(specifically looking at Islam and Christianity) are more violent or peace loving than others.
Nor do we find any evidence that being religious by itself leads to more conflict. We argue that
what matters is having distinct groups which are culturally dissimilar, like Christians, Hindus,
and Muslims etc. leading to more diversity at the level of aggregation that takes into account
the cultural dissimilarity between the groups. The actual combination of religions that leads
to more diversity does not matter. More importantly, the intolerance of the government and
7In appendix Table B.3 we see that the correlation between our measures of religious diversity and the ethno-
linguistic diversity measures of Desmet et al. (2012) are very low. Most are below 0.2 and the highest is 0.37
which is the correlation between their elf10 and our rfrac2.
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society of a country is more relevant for conflict than the presence of any particular religion.
Our results are robust to the use of alternate datasets and specifications, viz. Desmet
et al. (2012) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). We then add a host of additional controls
including ethnic fractionalization, ethnic polarization, percentage of different religious groups
including Muslims, Christians and even Atheists and Non-religious. Our results remain robust.
The literature puts forward several theories on why religious diversity or for that matter
any form of ethnic diversity should be at all germane to conflict once we control for say, per-
capita income.8 Most of these theories can be categorized as pertaining to either primordialist
theories - where ethnic considerations directly enter an agent’s utility function, or instrumentalist
theories - where ethnicity plays a strategic role.9
Our results can be explained as much by the “primordial” theories as by the “instru-
mental” theories. We do not take any stand on which of the two approaches best explains our
findings. Huntington’s view, which is arguably primordialist suggests, “ that the fundamental
source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The
great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.” “The
fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future” (Huntington (1993a)).
“Civilizations” refers to groups “... differentiated from each other by history, language, culture,
tradition and, most important, religion”(Huntington (1993a). One could interpret Hindusim,
Christianity, and Islam etc. as representing different civilizations.
On the other hand, thinking in terms of the instrumental approach (say a la Caselli and
Coleman (2012)), ethnicity acts as a boundary-enforcement device. Ethnic markers help enforce
group membership and allow restricting the spoils to a smaller set of individuals (Esteban et al.
(2012b)). Caselli and Coleman (2012) underscore that the ethnic distance between religions
might be fairly high since there might be huge psychological costs associated with abandoning
one’s religious identity. It is arguably more costly for a Christian to pass off as a Hindu, than say
a Protestant to pass off as a Catholic. The “ethnic distance” is a lot lower between a Catholic
and a Protestant individual than that between a Hindu and a Christian.
In this paper we seek to make a four-fold contribution to the diversity and conflict
literature. As discussed above most of the existing literature has focused on the relation between
8The relation between low per-capita income and conflict is one of the most robust results in the literature.
See Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004), and Fearon and Laitin (2003) for example.
9Examples of primordialist models: Alesina et al. (1999), Alesina and La Ferrara (2000); Esteban and Ray
(1999) (from Blattman and Miguel (2010)). Examples of instrumental models: Esteban et al. (2012a), Mitra and
Ray (2010), Chandra (2004), Caselli and Coleman (2012)
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ethno-linguistic diversity and civil conflict. This is a serious gap in the literature. As Huntington
(1993b) highlights, “In the modern world, religion is a central, perhaps the central, force that
motivates and mobilizes people.” Thus, our first contribution is that we rigorously investigate
the relation between religious diversity and civil conflict by calculating indices of diversity at
three different levels of aggregation. We then and let the data tell us what level of aggregation
matters for civil conflict.
The second contribution is that we highlight the importance of intolerance in the debate
on diversity and conflict. Religious diversity may or may not be important in predicting conflict
depending on how tolerant or intolerant society is towards other religions. Moreover, both
diversity and conflict might be correlated to intolerance. Thus, it is impossible to over emphasize
the importance of intolerance.
Thirdly, one often heard argument is that some religions are more peace-loving or more
violent than others. Thus one could argue that it is not religious diversity that matters per
se but some religions by virtue of being more violent than others lead to more civil conflicts.
Controlling for the percentage of Christians, Muslims and Atheists/Non-religious populations
we are partly able to answer this question. We find no evidence whatsoever of some religion
being more violent than others or that being religious by itself makes countries more or less
violent.
Our final contribution is in terms of the new dataset that we create. We construct six
different measures of religious diversity (fractionalization and polarization) at three different
levels of aggregation corresponding to different historical depths of cleavages. Moreover, we
generate a completely new index of religious intolerance.
To the best of our knowledge no other study has done such a rigorous analysis of the
relation between religious diversity, religious intolerance and civil conflict. Moreover, no data
on such detailed measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance currently exist for such
an exhaustive list of countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our data sources
and explain the construction of our measures in detail. In Section 3 we report our results and
in Section 4 we conclude.
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2 Data & Methodology
2.1 Religious diversity
In order to construct our measures of religious diversity we follow the methodology of Desmet
et al. (2012). They compute ethno-linguistic diversity measures at different levels of aggregation
by exploiting the information of language trees. They refer to this as a phylogenetic approach,
since tree diagrams describe the family structure of world languages. Depending on how finely
or coarsely groups are defined the measure of diversity will be different.
This approach has two advantages. Firstly, it allows the classification of diversity at
different levels of aggregation. Secondly and perhaps more interestingly this approach gives a
historical dimension to the analysis. Coarse divisions, obtained at high levels of aggregation,
describe cleavages that go back thousands of years. In contrast, finer divisions, obtained at
low levels of aggregation, are the result of more recent cleavages. Moreover, calculating our
diversity measure at three different levels we are able to introduce in our indices a measure of
cultural dissimilarity between religions. Hindus and Christians are culturally more dissimilar
than Protestants and Catholics. This cultural dissimilarity aspect is a crucial point in the Clash
of Civilizations hypothesis.
The data on religious diversity comes from three distinct sources. We primarily use the
CIA World Factbook,10 and the Alesina et al. (2003) data from Encyclopedia Britannica (EB).
Both of these datasets give the proportion of adherents to different religions in the different coun-
tries of the world. This data is supplemented by data from http://www.worldstatesmen.org/11
in case of missing values or lack of detail for some country. Our criteria was to have the most
detailed data possible on sub-categories of religions which would allow us to construct mean-
ingful indices at the different levels. For example for Papua New Guinea, the different groups
following the CIA World factbook are Baha’i, Indigenous religions, Roman Catholic, Evangeli-
cal Lutheran, United Church, Seven day Adventist, Pentecostal, Evangelical Alliance, Anglican,
Baptist and Other Protestant. Whereas following the EB there are only the four following
groups: Protestant, Roman Catholic, Anglican, and Others. Thus, in this case we prefer to use
the CIA data instead of the EB data.
10Fearon and Laitin (2003) use a similar dataset based on estimates derived using the CIA Factbook by R.
Quinn Mecham.
11Allan Drazen also uses data from “World Statesmen” but on some different variables. See: http :
//econweb.umd.edu/ drazen/Data Sets/Appendix Composition and Elections revision22012.pdf
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Finally using this data on the percentage of followers of the different religions in each
country, we construct six different measures of religious diversity (three of fractionalization and
three of polarization) following the below explained methodology. All religions in the world can
be classified into several broad groups owing to their origins or cultural traditions. For example,
Christianity and Islam are both Abrahamic religions, while Hinduism and Buddhism are both
Indian religions. Again, Protestants and Catholics are two sects of Christianity, while Sunnis
and Shias are two sects of Islam. For the purposes of this paper we represent this information as
tree diagram as given in Figure 1. As evident in Figure 1, sects like Protestants, Catholics, Shias
and Sunnis form our Level 3, which is the most disaggregated level. Then at Level 2 come the
parent religions of these sects (Christianity and Islam in this case). And finally at the highest
level i.e. Level 1 we have the broad groupings like Abrahamic and Indian religions. Our final
data comprises of 118 religious groups at the third level, 45 groups at the second level and 5
groups at the first level (excluding Atheists and Non-religious).12
Figure 1: The religion tree
As evident in Figure 1, classifying the above broad groups and their corresponding divi-
sions and subdivisions as a tree diagram we have three different levels at which we can measure
12The entire list of the divisions can be found in the appendix Table B.13.
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religious diversity. We thus construct three indices of religious fractionalization (rfrac1, rfrac2,
and rfrac3) and three indices of religious polarization (rpol1, rpol2, and rpol3) corresponding
to the three different levels of aggregation. Rfrac1 (rpol1) corresponds to the highest level of
aggregation i.e. it is the most aggregated. Rfrac2 (rpol2) corresponds to the second level of
aggregation. And rfrac3 (rpol3) corresponds to the lowest level of aggregation i.e. it is the least
aggregated.
The idea behind the measures at each level is identical to the measures of ethno-linguistic
diversity (ELF) in Desmet et al. (2012). The different measures of fractionalization and polar-
ization are constructed as follows:
Fractionalization:
rfrac(j) = 1− Σ[Si(j)]2. (1)
Polarization:
rpol(j) = 4Σ[Si(j)]
2[1− Si(j)]. (2)
where Si(j) is the proportion of the population pertaining to religious group i at level of ag-
gregation j.13 The fractionalization measure rfrac(j) gives the probability that two randomly
selected individuals from a given country belong to different religious groups. The polarization
measure rpol(j) on the other hand measures how far the distribution of the religious groups is
from the bipolar distribution (i.e. the (1/2, 0, 0, ... , 0, 1/2) distribution) which represents the
highest level of polarization (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005)). The fractionalization index
is maximized when each individual in the country belongs to a different religious group, while
the polarization index is maximized when there are only two groups in the country and they
are equally sized. The reader is directed to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) for a detailed
discussion and comparison of the two measures.
In order to better illustrate the importance of aggregating at the three different levels
let us consider a few countries that have experienced civil conflicts in the past few decades.
Consider Angola for example. It is a highly religiously polarized country at any of the three
levels of aggregation. At aggregation level 3, it is the 13th most polarized country in the world.
However, once we move up levels, it comes out to be the most and second most polarized
13In case of ethno-linguistic diversity as in Desmet et al. (2012), Si(j) refers to the share of population speaking
a particular language i at level of aggregation j.
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country in the world considering the 2nd and 1st levels of aggregation respectively. Moreover, if
we consider countries like India, Nepal or Indonesia, their religious diversity rankings change by
about 60 places moving from the third to the second level of aggregation. The movement from
the 3rd to the 2nd level and that from the 2nd to the 1st level need not always be in the same
direction. For instance for India, the ranking keeps going up if we move from the 3rd to the 2nd
level or the 2nd to the 1st level. However, for Indonesia and Nepal, the ranking goes up from
the 3rd to the 2nd level, and falls while moving from the 2nd to the 1st level. These examples
help illustrate how changes in the level of aggregation could lead to non-trivial changes in the
rankings according to religious diversity.14
At any given level, religious fractionalization and religious polarization are highly corre-
lated. While moving from one level to another in many cases both religious fractionalization and
polarization seem to move in the same direction. However, the relative changes in the rankings
are often different. Consider Nigeria for example. Its polarization ranking is 96 at level 3 making
it not a very polarized country. Its fractionalization ranking is 28, making it highly fractionalized
country. But when we move to level 2, its fractionalization ranking goes up 19 places to 7, while
its polarization ranking goes up 65 places to 31. Moreover, there are cases when the rankings
by fractionalization and polarization move in opposite directions while moving from one level
to the other. For example, Lebanon is a highly fractionalized country with its fractionalization
ranking being 16 at level 3. But it is not a very polarized country placed at rank 116 at level
3. Once we move up one level to level 2, its fractionalization ranking goes down by a marginal
4 places, placing it at 20. On the other hand, its polarization ranking shoots up by 90 places
taking it to a rank of 26.15
In Tables 1 and 2 we provide the summary statistics and the correlations between the
six different measures of religious diversity. In the appendix Tables B.2 and B.3 we have the
correlations of our measures of religious diversity with those of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2005) and Desmet et al. (2012) respectively. We notice that there is not a very high correlation
between our measures and those of either Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) (most are below
0.5 and the highest is 0.7 which is the correlation between their relfrac and our rfrac2) or Desmet
et al. (2012) (most are below 0.2 and the highest is 0.37 which is the correlation between their
14In view of the recent happenings in the Arab world, it is interesting in its own right to look at the religious
diversity indices of the Arab Spring countries. While none of these countries have very high levels of religious
diversity, their rankings go up significantly while moving up from the 3rd to the 2nd level of aggregation.
15See maps in appendix figures A.6 to A.11 to visualize how the rankings change across countries moving from
one level to another.
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elf10 and our rfrac2).16
Table 1: Summary statistics for the religious diversity indices
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Religious fractionalization at level 1 0.156 0.178 0 0.643
Religious fractionalization at level 2 0.239 0.206 0 0.703
Religious fractionalization at level 3 0.432 0.25 0 0.891
Religious polarization at level 1 0.295 0.325 0 1
Religious polarization at level 2 0.412 0.321 0 0.996
Religious polarization at level 3 0.570 0.259 0 0.992
N 222
Table 2: Correlation between the religious diversity indices
rfrac1 rpol1 rfrac2 rpol2 rfrac3
rpol1 0.9906
rfrac2 0.8235 0.8132
rpol2 0.7818 0.7906 0.9669
rfrac3 0.5472 0.5504 0.5845 0.5721
rpol3 0.5022 0.5146 0.5864 0.6281 0.7821
2.2 Religious Intolerance
One obvious concern with any study analysing the effects of religious diversity on conflict is
the possible endogeneity of religious diversity. Societies that are more tolerant towards other
religions are likely to sustain more religions and thus experience more religious diversity on the
one hand, and less civil conflict on the other. Thus if we are to say anything interesting about the
effects of religious diversity on civil conflict we must take into account how tolerant the society
is. If we do not control for religious intolerance we would be facing the risk of endogeneity
arising from the omitted variable bias.
Measuring religious intolerance is not an easy task since getting reliable data is a big
challenge. We use the cross-national, International Religious freedom data, from the Association
of Religious Data Archives (ARDA). The specific dataset used is the “International Religious
Freedom Data, Aggregate File (2001-2005).”17
Each year (since 1999) the U.S. State Department releases International Religious Free-
dom Reports on approximately 196 countries or territories.18 Based on the text in these reports,
ARDA researchers systematically coded the measures using a survey questionnaire for the years
16A list of all the 222 countries along with their corresponding rankings according to the different rfrac and
rpol values is provided in the appendix Tables B.15 and B.16.
17http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/IRFAGG.asp
18http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/
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2001, 2003, and 2005. The most immediate goal was to develop measures for religious regulation
and favouritism. For all variables, the coders were asked to make substantive observations of
the qualitative data and to base their codes on empirical observations of actions or patterns of
behaviour that were documented in the reports.
The three different years of coding are not three discrete measures, but rather represent
trend information that continues to be reported for several years running. Thus, ARDA advises
researchers to not treat the data as separate measures from which time lines are developed since
it may be possible that later years report newly arising problems in addition to old ones. The
aggregate dataset for the three years of coding contains the mean score of each ordinal variable
across the three years. ARDA suggests that those using the data for social scientific modelling
and analysis use the aggregate data set, which has the benefit of greater variation in the variables
and lesser error since random errors from one year will be attenuated in the aggregate data. We
thus use this aggregate dataset which contains the different indices measured as averages of the
three years 2001, 2003 and 2005.19
In order to construct our measures of religious intolerance we take into account three
different broad level indices which are related to religious intolerance.
1. Government Regulation Index (GRI): This index takes into account the following factors:
whether foreign or other missionaries are allowed to operate; if proselytizing, public preach-
ing, or conversion is limited or restricted; if the government interferes with an individual’s
right to worship; how freedom of religion is described in the report; and, if the Introduc-
tion section of the Report mentions that the government “generally respects” the right (to
religious freedom) in practice.
2. Social Regulation Index (SRI): This index takes into account the following factors: the
societal attitudes toward other or non-traditional religions; social attitudes towards con-
versions to other religions; if traditional attitudes and/or edicts of the clerical establish-
ment strongly discourage proselytizing [trying to win converts]; if established or existing
religions try to shut out other religions in any way; and the situation regarding social
movements in relation to religious brands in the country.
3. Government Favouritism Index (GFI): This index takes into account the following factors:
What is the balance of government funding (including ‘in kind’ such as funding buildings)
19The reader is directed to the ARDA website for a more detailed description of the data.
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to the religious sector; how does the government subsidize religion (including ‘in kind’ to
organizations run by religions, e.g., hospitals, schools, etc.); and if the government funds
some things related to religion.
Making use of the above indices we construct our measure of religious intolerance via
a principal component analysis for 197 countries. Religious intolerance is defined as the first
principal component of the three variables, GRI, SRI and GFI. This allows us not only to reduce
the dimensionality i.e. have one measure of religious intolerance instead of multiple ones, but also
since we use the first principal component we are able to explain about 74% of the orthogonal
variation in the data with our measure of religious intolerance.
It is of course possible that our measure of religious intolerance is itself endogenous to
conflict. If individuals of any religion experience more conflict with individuals of other religions
they might become more intolerant towards other religions and thus the possibility of reverse
causality. This is very much a realistic possibility and given our data we partly solve this problem
by using a time invariant measure of intolerance. Moreover, we leave out other available variables
that also indicate religious intolerance but are more prone to endogeneity. For example variables
like, ESTIMAAG - estimated number of people who were physically abused or displaced due to
religion and PERSECAG - estimated number of people who were physically abused, displaced
from home, imprisoned, or killed due to religion, are left out. Government and Social regulation
of religion are variables that are relatively stable over long periods of time.20
In Table 3, we provide the summary statistics of the religious intolerance variable and
its components. Higher values of the variable indicate more intolerance. In Table B.17 of the
appendix there is a list of all countries with the corresponding value of religious intolerance of
that country. The ten most intolerant countries in our sample are Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan,
Burma (or Myanmar), Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and the Maldives, in that
order.21
In appendix Table B.1 we provide the correlations of religious intolerance with the mea-
sures of diversity calculated at different aggregation levels. We notice that as expected religious
intolerance is negatively correlated with religious diversity at all levels of aggregation. The
correlations are not very high, the highest correlation being of about -0.4 between religious
20As a robustness check we do include both ESTIMAAG and PERSECAG in the calculation of our intolerance
index. But due to their potential endogeneity we leave them out from our final calculations. However, results
remain qualitatively unchanged to their inclusion. Results are not provided, but are available upon request.
21Appendix Figure A.5 gives a world map for religious intolerance.
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intolerance and religious fractionalization at the third level of aggregation.
Table 3: Summary statistics - Religious intolerance
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Government Regulation Index 3.293 3.076 0 9.722
Social Regulation Index 3.605 2.928 0 10
Government Favouritism Index 4.837 2.778 0 9.388
Religious intolerance -0.008 1.489 -2.299 3.258
N 197
2.3 Specification
We use the above constructed measures to study the effects of religious diversity and intolerance
on the onset of civil conflict. Our baseline econometric specification follows Desmet et al. (2012)
who in turn borrow it from the baseline specification of Fearon and Laitin (2003) and augment
it with a number of additional control variables.
yit = α+ δDi(j) + γIi + βXit + it (3)
where, yit is the the onset of civil conflict (ethnic conflict in some specifications) in country i in
year t, Di(j) is a time invariant measure of religious diversity at aggregation level j in country
i, Ii is the time invariant religious intolerance in country i, α is the constant term and it the
error term. The vector of controls Xit come from major contributions in the literature. They
include, lagged civil war, the log of per capita GDP (lagged), the percentage of the country that
is mountainous, non-contiguous state dummy, oil exporter dummy, new state dummy, instability
dummy, democracy lagged (polity2), continent dummy variables for Sub-Saharan Africa, East
and Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and legal origin dummies from La Porta
et al. (1999). A pooled panel probit approach is used. Since we want to study the partial effects
of religious diversity and religious intolerance on civil conflict, δ and γ are the main coefficients
of interest.22
22Causality is not the main focus of this paper and thus caution should be exercised when interpreting δ and
γ causally.
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3 Results
3.1 Civil Conflict
First, using the data, estimation method and dependent variable (the onset of civil conflict) of
Desmet et al. (2012), we examine how religious diversity and religious intolerance affect civil
conflict. The difference is that instead of using their measures of ethno-linguistic diversity we
use our measures of religious diversity in addition to controlling for religious intolerance in
some of the specifications. Also, following Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) we include both
fractionalization and polarization in the same specification.23
Table 4 gives our baseline results. The dependent variable is the onset of civil war.
Columns 1 to 3 each correspond to a different level of aggregation in the calculation of religious
diversity. Column 1 corresponds to the highest level of aggregation while column 3 to the lowest
level. Columns 4 to 6 are identical to the specifications of columns 1 to 3, but in these three
columns we also control for religious intolerance.
In the first three columns we notice that while religious polarization is marginally sig-
nificant at the third level of aggregation neither religious fractionalization nor polarization are
significant in any of the other specifications. In columns 4 to 6, where we control for religious
intolerance in the specifications of columns 1 to 3, the results change substantially. We see that
religious intolerance is associated with more civil conflict and the relation is significant. Reli-
gious diversity on the other hand becomes significant at the second level of aggregation. While
religious fractionalization is negatively significant, religious polarization is positively significant.
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) argue, “this means that, conditional on a given degree of
polarization, more religious diversity decreases the probability of a civil war. ... a high number of
different groups increases the coordination problems and, therefore, given a level of polarization,
the probability of civil wars may be smaller.”24
In Table 4 we see that religious intolerance is an important correlate of civil conflict.
Thus any study investigating the correlates of civil conflict needs to control for this variable.
Moreover, both religious fractionalization and polarization become significant at the second level
of aggregation once we control for religious intolerance. Thus it is evident that the non-inclusion
23In the appendix we have a specification where the measures enter separately rather than together without
intolerance - Table B.5, and with intolerance - Table B.6.
24Like Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) we also find that if religious fractionalization and religious polar-
ization enter the specification separately, they are not significant. Results in appendix Tables B.5 and B.6.
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Table 4: Correlates of Civil Conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Level1 Level2 Level3 Level1 Level2 Level3
Religious fractionalization -8.280 -2.859 -1.639 -10.27* -3.791* -1.077
(5.297) (2.100) (1.257) (5.805) (2.154) (1.283)
Religious polarization 4.068 1.595 1.755* 5.255 2.240* 1.473
(2.987) (1.314) (0.974) (3.208) (1.339) (0.958)
Lagged civil war -0.872*** -0.892*** -0.899*** -0.931*** -0.956*** -0.928***
(0.262) (0.267) (0.260) (0.249) (0.247) (0.245)
Log lagged GDP/capita -0.603*** -0.607*** -0.553*** -0.512*** -0.510*** -0.496***
(0.148) (0.147) (0.151) (0.158) (0.156) (0.158)
Log lagged population 0.336*** 0.319*** 0.301*** 0.275*** 0.254*** 0.238***
(0.0827) (0.0766) (0.0736) (0.0937) (0.0862) (0.0846)
% mountainous 0.00931* 0.00805 0.00757 0.00848 0.00652 0.00640
(0.00481) (0.00497) (0.00511) (0.00548) (0.00578) (0.00565)
Noncontiguos state dummy 0.373 0.417 0.441 0.478 0.527 0.568
(0.370) (0.368) (0.353) (0.365) (0.357) (0.347)
Oil exporter dummy 0.683*** 0.707*** 0.710*** 0.467* 0.494** 0.538**
(0.239) (0.238) (0.230) (0.253) (0.243) (0.239)
New state dummy 1.771*** 1.781*** 1.793*** 1.713*** 1.730*** 1.746***
(0.371) (0.371) (0.377) (0.382) (0.383) (0.383)
Instability dummy 0.606*** 0.626*** 0.646*** 0.602*** 0.619*** 0.641***
(0.217) (0.215) (0.217) (0.218) (0.216) (0.219)
Democracy lagged (Polity 2) 0.0200 0.0194 0.0231 0.0274 0.0279 0.0295
(0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0207) (0.0206) (0.0205) (0.0207)
French legal origin dummy 1.258* 1.547** 1.842** 1.082 1.373* 1.612*
(0.679) (0.706) (0.799) (0.749) (0.770) (0.858)
UK legal origin dummy 1.027 1.308* 1.601** 0.724 1.040 1.198
(0.669) (0.685) (0.797) (0.750) (0.766) (0.871)
Socialist legal origin dummy 1.289* 1.347** 1.445* 1.224 1.257* 1.276
(0.708) (0.684) (0.783) (0.761) (0.745) (0.833)
Latin America and Carribean Dummy 0.172 0.112 -0.0117 0.581 0.566 0.370
(0.404) (0.397) (0.431) (0.393) (0.394) (0.422)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.295 0.288 0.235 0.770* 0.834* 0.614
(0.401) (0.479) (0.481) (0.435) (0.491) (0.473)
East and Southeast Asia Dummy 0.600* 0.404 0.344 0.812** 0.620* 0.440
(0.354) (0.349) (0.336) (0.387) (0.366) (0.357)
Rel intolerance 0.240** 0.250** 0.219**
(0.102) (0.104) (0.108)
Constant -4.491*** -4.553*** -5.359*** -4.728*** -4.815*** -5.232***
(1.732) (1.685) (1.797) (1.788) (1.739) (1.869)
Observations 5733 5733 5733 5678 5678 5678
Pseudo R2 0.100 0.098 0.101 0.105 0.103 0.104
ll -453.6 -454.5 -453.3 -450.3 -451.0 -450.7
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious
diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Desmet
et al. (2012) except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the
author’s own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.
of the religious intolerance variable would have led us to erroneously conclude that religious
diversity is not relevant for civil conflict, while it clearly is.
This significance of the measures of religious diversity constructed at the second level
of aggregation implies that the cleavage between Hindus, Muslims, and Christians etc. is more
relevant than a higher or lower level of aggregation. This gives further support to our hypothesis
18
that the level of aggregation at which the measures of diversity are constructed is important.
Next, we specifically investigate the effects of religious diversity and intolerance on the
onset of ethnic conflict in particular rather than civil conflict in general. In Table 5, we have
the onset of ethnic conflict as the dependent variable in the otherwise identical specification of
Table 4. We again find that religious fractionalization significantly reduces conflict while reli-
gious polarization significantly increases the onset of conflict, at the second level of aggregation.
Religious intolerance however, becomes insignificant and thus seems not to matter for ethnic
conflict. However, it is still evident that in order to correctly identify the effects of religious
diversity we still need to control for religious intolerance.
3.2 Components of intolerance
Our measure of religious intolerance is constructed using three different components viz. govern-
ment regulation, social regulation and government favouritism. Next we analyse which of these
specific components of religious intolerance are more important. In Table 6 we use the identical
specifications of the last three columns of Tables 4 and 5, but in place of religious intolerance we
control for its different components separately in the 3 panels. The columns 1 to 3 (and thus 4
to 6) each correspond to a different level of aggregation in the calculation of religious diversity.
The dependent variable in the columns 1 to 3 is the onset of civil conflict, while in the columns
4 to 6 it is the onset of ethnic conflict.
In Table 6, we see that government and social regulation of religion are significant and
robust correlates of civil conflict. On the other hand, government favouritism of religion does
not seem to be important. Moreover, this result holds true equally for the onset of civil and
ethnic conflicts, even though our overall measure of religious intolerance did not seem to matter
for ethnic conflict. This result is not surprising since government and social regulation of religion
are arguably more fundamental types of intolerance since they relate to the more fundamental
right of freedom to religion, while government favouritism is less so.
We also notice that when we control for each component of religious intolerance sepa-
rately our religious diversity measures become somewhat less robust in predicting civil conflict.
However, as far as ethnic conflict is concerned, religious diversity at the second level of aggre-
gation still continues to be significant.
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Table 5: Correlates of ethnic conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Level1 Level2 Level3 Level1 Level2 Level3
Religious fractionalization -6.509 -4.036 -1.708 -7.618 -4.730* -1.188
(6.466) (2.485) (1.762) (6.964) (2.602) (1.847)
Religious polarization 2.970 2.502 2.299* 3.651 2.979* 2.047
(3.606) (1.578) (1.267) (3.850) (1.672) (1.292)
Lagged civil war -0.900*** -0.981*** -0.971*** -0.926*** -1.010*** -0.965***
(0.310) (0.322) (0.325) (0.305) (0.306) (0.316)
Log lagged GDP/capita -0.550*** -0.540*** -0.474*** -0.451*** -0.423*** -0.410**
(0.147) (0.143) (0.157) (0.164) (0.157) (0.163)
Log lagged population 0.461*** 0.471*** 0.446*** 0.433*** 0.424*** 0.397***
(0.111) (0.108) (0.103) (0.130) (0.128) (0.127)
% mountainous 0.0101* 0.00824 0.00789 0.0102 0.00760 0.00757
(0.00601) (0.00627) (0.00623) (0.00653) (0.00715) (0.00675)
Noncontiguos state dummy 0.363 0.286 0.323 0.477 0.424 0.468
(0.369) (0.369) (0.329) (0.381) (0.378) (0.352)
Oil exporter dummy 1.015*** 1.021*** 1.007*** 0.841*** 0.820*** 0.852***
(0.286) (0.277) (0.287) (0.301) (0.294) (0.299)
New state dummy 1.654*** 1.669*** 1.673*** 1.623*** 1.631*** 1.639***
(0.434) (0.434) (0.440) (0.445) (0.445) (0.446)
Instability dummy 0.413 0.436* 0.471* 0.404 0.421* 0.455*
(0.253) (0.249) (0.255) (0.255) (0.250) (0.260)
Democracy lagged (Polity 2) 0.0318 0.0303 0.0355 0.0356 0.0365 0.0400*
(0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0234) (0.0236) (0.0234) (0.0242)
French legal origin dummy 15.19*** 15.60*** 16.07*** 15.21*** 15.59*** 16.02***
(1.558) (1.439) (1.725) (1.586) (1.471) (1.682)
UK legal origin dummy 15.03*** 15.43*** 15.85*** 14.98*** 15.36*** 15.66***
(1.597) (1.461) (1.694) (1.602) (1.470) (1.653)
Socialist legal origin dummy 15.23*** 15.31*** 15.45*** 15.31*** 15.36*** 15.44***
(1.630) (1.579) (1.845) (1.668) (1.611) (1.843)
Latin America and Carribean Dummy -2.089** -2.151** -2.349** -1.868* -1.827* -2.100**
(1.052) (1.050) (1.011) (1.081) (1.077) (1.042)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.986** 0.841 0.745 1.293*** 1.290** 0.992
(0.394) (0.543) (0.634) (0.488) (0.561) (0.644)
East and Southeast Asia Dummy 0.450 0.280 0.223 0.567 0.444 0.272
(0.361) (0.354) (0.396) (0.374) (0.349) (0.400)
Rel intolerance 0.134 0.180 0.145
(0.138) (0.140) (0.142)
Constant -20.47 -21.04 -22.19 -21.14 -21.70 -22.35
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Observations 5733 5733 5733 5678 5678 5678
Pseudo R2 0.153 0.153 0.156 0.156 0.157 0.158
ll -320.1 -320.1 -318.9 -318.6 -318.1 -317.5
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the onset of ethnic conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious
diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Desmet
et al. (2012) except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the
author’s own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.
3.3 Are some religions more problematic than others?
One often heard argument is that some religions are more violent than others. Thus, one could
argue that it is not religious diversity that matters per se but some religions by virtue of being
more violent than others lead to more civil conflicts. In this section we investigate this claim
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Table 6: Components of Intolerance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Level1 Level2 Level3 Level1 Level2 Level3
Religious fractionalization -10.02* -3.728* -1.178 -8.558 -5.264** -1.098
(5.739) (2.119) (1.274) (7.203) (2.591) (1.857)
Religious polarization 4.990 2.094 1.434 4.125 3.283** 1.896
(3.157) (1.302) (0.981) (3.953) (1.629) (1.352)
Government Regulation Index 0.108** 0.110** 0.0849 0.115** 0.136** 0.0999
(0.0442) (0.0463) (0.0521) (0.0548) (0.0563) (0.0652)
Observations 5678 5678 5678 5476 5476 5476
Pseudo R2 0.104 0.102 0.102 0.153 0.154 0.154
ll -450.6 -451.5 -451.5 -317.5 -316.9 -317.0
Religious fractionalization -8.915 -3.246 -0.920 -7.237 -4.407* -0.951
(6.210) (2.126) (1.190) (7.482) (2.587) (1.758)
Religious polarization 4.612 1.896 1.313 3.618 2.820* 1.897
(3.363) (1.333) (0.893) (4.094) (1.666) (1.248)
Social Regulation Index 0.163*** 0.170*** 0.164*** 0.135** 0.150** 0.148**
(0.0530) (0.0525) (0.0559) (0.0639) (0.0656) (0.0701)
Observations 5678 5678 5678 5476 5476 5476
Pseudo R2 0.109 0.108 0.109 0.154 0.156 0.158
ll -448.2 -448.5 -448.2 -317.0 -316.3 -315.6
Religious fractionalization -8.501 -3.036 -1.425 -5.167 -3.591 -1.540
(5.412) (2.134) (1.275) (6.336) (2.370) (1.790)
Religious polarization 4.190 1.716 1.662* 2.144 2.117 2.035
(3.055) (1.344) (0.967) (3.532) (1.545) (1.248)
Government Favoritism Index 0.0110 0.0145 0.0146 -0.0918 -0.0751 -0.0725
(0.0505) (0.0517) (0.0517) (0.0702) (0.0727) (0.0751)
Observations 5678 5678 5678 5476 5476 5476
Pseudo R2 0.100 0.098 0.100 0.151 0.150 0.153
ll -452.8 -453.7 -452.7 -318.0 -318.3 -317.5
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to
religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data
are from Desmet et al. (2012) except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance
which are based on the author’s own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in
detail in the data section. The other controls are: a constant term, lagged civil war, the log of
per capita GDP (lagged), the percentage of the country that is mountainous, non-contiguous state
dummy, oil exporter dummy, new state dummy, Instability dummy, democracy lagged (polity2),
continent dummy variables for Sub-Saharan Africa, East and Southeast Asia, Latin America and
the Caribbean, and legal origin dummies from La Porta et al. (1999).
and find no evidence whatsoever in its favour. Since Christians and Muslims are the biggest
religious groups in the world and are widely distributed across countries we consider these two
religions. We also consider the presence of Atheists/Agnostics and Non-religious populations.
In Table 7 we have religious diversity at the second level of aggregation and religious
intolerance as before. We however, also control for the percentage of Muslims, Christians, and
Non-religious etc. entering in different combinations. We find no evidence whatsoever of some
religion being more violent or peace loving than others since the coefficients of these variables
are always insignificant. Religious diversity and intolerance continue to be significant.
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Table 7: Controlling for percentage of different groups (Aggregation Level 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Religious fractionalization -3.805* -3.834* -3.782* -3.794* -3.844* -3.879* -3.908*
(2.187) (2.190) (2.150) (2.176) (2.219) (2.172) (2.198)
Religious polarization 2.363* 2.231* 2.215 2.333* 2.353* 2.114 2.218
(1.358) (1.343) (1.353) (1.360) (1.361) (1.374) (1.379)
Rel intolerance 0.236** 0.268** 0.240** 0.219* 0.253** 0.273** 0.257**
(0.108) (0.120) (0.112) (0.117) (0.123) (0.121) (0.124)
Percentage Nonreligious/Atheists -0.00753 -0.00825 -0.00751 -0.00945
(0.00945) (0.00949) (0.00947) (0.00954)
Percentage Muslims -0.00118 -0.00115 -0.00364 -0.00454
(0.00417) (0.00413) (0.00635) (0.00612)
Percentage Christians -0.000990 -0.00166 -0.00339 -0.00472
(0.00419) (0.00422) (0.00639) (0.00630)
Observations 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678
Pseudo R2 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.105
ll -450.7 -450.9 -450.9 -450.6 -450.6 -450.8 -450.3
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious
diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Desmet et al.
(2012) except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the author’s
own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section. The other controls
are: a constant term, lagged civil war, the log of per capita GDP (lagged), the percentage of the country that is
mountainous, non-contiguous state dummy, oil exporter dummy, new state dummy, Instability dummy, democracy
lagged (polity2), continent dummy variables for Sub-Saharan Africa, East and Southeast Asia, Latin America
and the Caribbean, and legal origin dummies from La Porta et al. (1999).
Looking at the list of countries ranked by our measure of religious intolerance in appendix
Table B.17, one could argue that since most of the Muslim majority countries figure high up on
the list, our insignificance of the percentage of Muslims in the data is driven by the inclusion of
the religious intolerance variable. In appendix Table B.9 we use the same specification of Table
7 but leave the religious intolerance variable out. As expected, the exclusion of the religious
intolerance variable makes our diversity measures insignificant. However, the variables giving
the percentages of the different groups continue to be insignificant. Thus, the insignificance of
these variables are not driven by the inclusion of religious intolerance in the specification.25
In the diversity measures we have been using so far, each religious group existing at a
particular level enters as a separate entity at that level. One might argue that if a particular
religion is more problematic than others then the relevant conflict inducing cleavage is the one
between that problematic religion and all other religions. Thus, a diversity index which includes
all religions separately might not be the best one to pick this effect up. In order to verify this,
we construct three new measures of religious diversity dividing the population of each country
25As seen in the Table B.4 the correlation between religious intolerance and the percentage of different groups
is not especially high.
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into only two mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups for each of the three measures. In the
first one, we consider only Muslims and Non-Muslims as the relevant groups, in the second
one we consider only Christians and Non-Christians as the relevant groups and finally, in the
third one we consider only Religious and Atheists/ Non-Religious as the relevant groups. Since,
in this case there are only two groups entering the calculation of diversity, both polarization
and fractionalization yield the same ranking of countries. We use fractionalization without loss
of generality.26 Neither of these new measures of diversity are significant with or without the
inclusion of religious intolerance. Religious intolerance continues to have a significant effect on
civil conflict.27
The insignificance of the diversity measures that include only the division between Mus-
lims and Non-Muslims or that between Christians and Non-Christians further supports our
previous finding that neither Christianity nor Islam is particularly problematic. The insignif-
icance of the diversity index that includes only Religious and Atheists/ Non-Religious as the
relevant groups, indicates that the cleavage between the religious and Non-religious people in
the country is not relevant in predicting civil conflict.
3.4 Robustness checks
Next, we try to ensure that our results are robust to other datasets and specifications. In order
to do so we look specifically at the dataset and specification of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2005). They use a sample of 138 countries for the 1960-1999 period and divide the sample into
5 five-year periods. The data comes from the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) dataset
for civil wars and their basic endogenous variable corresponds to the incidence of civil wars
following the definition of PRIO which includes intermediate and high-intensity armed conflicts
(PRIOCW). 28
Their main finding is that ethnic polarization has a positive and statistically significant
effect on the incidence of civil wars. Then in some of their specifications they also look at the
effects of religious heterogeneity. They find that neither religious fractionalization nor religious
polarization have a significant effect on conflict when they enter separately. On the other hand,
26Using polarization instead would produce identical results. For only two groups polarization = 2*fractional-
ization (see Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) page 798 for a discussion.)
27Results are not provided and are available upon request. In the first two of these indices we have tried
including the atheists and Non-religious in the calculation. The inclusion or non-inclusion of the atheists and
Non-religious has no qualitative effect on the results.
28See Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) for more details.
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Table 8: Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) specification with Religious diversity & intolerance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Level1 Level2 Level3 Level1 Level2 Level3
Religious fractionalization -33.14*** -11.39*** -3.563* -52.84** -14.19*** -2.273
(12.55) (3.765) (1.923) (23.68) (4.379) (2.167)
Religious polarization 15.68** 6.924*** 3.809** 26.03** 8.882*** 3.392*
(6.803) (2.296) (1.806) (12.46) (2.897) (1.930)
LGDPC -0.584** -0.415 -0.427* -0.400* -0.243 -0.309
(0.237) (0.253) (0.225) (0.227) (0.235) (0.213)
LPOP 0.549*** 0.479*** 0.412** 0.410** 0.327* 0.238
(0.180) (0.151) (0.207) (0.202) (0.167) (0.222)
PRIMEXP 0.0697 -0.457 -0.569 -0.863 -1.167 -1.830
(2.068) (1.778) (1.694) (2.126) (1.679) (1.910)
MOUNTAINS -0.00478 -0.00391 -0.00582 -0.00660 -0.00659 -0.00562
(0.00925) (0.00921) (0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0105) (0.0100)
NONCONT 0.106 0.000484 0.330 0.185 0.0433 0.404
(0.581) (0.536) (0.622) (0.635) (0.550) (0.670)
DEMOCRACY 0.0675 0.0332 0.115 0.303 0.315 0.225
(0.348) (0.357) (0.354) (0.398) (0.397) (0.370)
ETHPOL 2.175** 2.276** 2.360** 1.896 1.804 1.885
(1.088) (1.109) (1.132) (1.155) (1.149) (1.180)
ETHFRAC 0.257 0.526 0.270 1.096 1.476 0.647
(0.920) (0.968) (1.004) (1.036) (1.007) (1.054)
Religious intolerance 0.395* 0.448** 0.407**
(0.212) (0.195) (0.192)
CONSTANT -7.160** -7.859*** -7.234** -6.728** -7.151** -5.542
(3.284) (2.862) (3.584) (3.343) (2.930) (3.691)
N 846 846 846 838 838 838
pseudo R2 0.178 0.154 0.157 0.215 0.202 0.190
ll -294.1 -302.7 -301.5 -279.9 -284.5 -288.6
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the incidence of civil wars from PRIO following the definition which
includes intermediate and high-intensity armed conflicts (PRIOCW). Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6)
correspond to religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively.
All the data are from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) except for the measures of religious
diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the author’s own calculations using data from
myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.
in the basic logit regressions using both religious fractionalization and religious polarization,
they find that religious fractionalization is marginally insignificant, while religious polarization
is statistically significant. However, once ethnic polarization is included only ethnic polarization
is significant and all the other diversity measures become insignificant. They argue that “It seems
clear that ethnic polarization has a robust and powerful explanatory power on civil wars in the
presence of other indices of fractionalization and polarization, while the statistical relevance of
religious polarization depends on the particular specification.” Thus, we try to verify if this is
indeed true or does our measure of religious diversity still have a significant effect on civil conflict
once we control for ethnic fractionalization and polarization. At the same time we also ensure
that our results are robust to using the PRIO dataset.
In Table 8 we use the data and specification of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and
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add to it our measures of religious diversity instead of theirs.29 Columns 1 to 3 correspond to
the 3 different levels of aggregation. Columns 4 to 6 are identical to columns 1 to 3 but also
control for religious intolerance. Unlike them we find that religious fractionalization and religious
polarization continue to be highly significant in predicting civil conflict even after controlling
for ethnic fractionalization and polarization. While this result holds at almost all levels of
aggregation, it is the second level of aggregation that is the most significant once we control
for religious intolerance. Also, religious intolerance is highly significant in all the specifications.
Moreover, while our measures of religious diversity continue to be significant, ethnic polarization
becomes insignificant once we control for religious intolerance. Most of the literature has so far
found ethnic polarization to be significant and religious diversity to be insignificant in explaining
civil conflict. But our finding indicates that the result was driven by the non-inclusion religious
intolerance in the specifications.
In Table B.11, we re-investigate which of the three components of religious intolerance are
more relevant. This is similar to Table 6, but while in Table 6 we use the data and specification
of Desmet et al. (2012), here we use the data and specification of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2005). In the first three columns we do not control for any component of intolerance whereas
in the last three we do control for each of the three components in the three different panels.
Again we clearly notice that government and social regulation of religion are highly significant
in explaining civil conflict. Moreover, religious diversity continues to be highly significant and
robust.
We finally subject our analysis to some more robustness checks. We control explicitly for
ethnic fractionalization and polarization from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) in the Desmet
et al. (2012) data and specification (Appendix Table B.10). Our results remain qualitatively
unchanged. We also added the percentage of Muslims, Christians and Non-religious/atheists in
the countries, both entering together and separately in of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005)
(Appendix Table B.12). As before, these variables have no significant impact on conflict leaving
our results qualitatively unchanged.30
In all the above analyses we do not consider the Non-religious/Atheists/Agnostics as
a relevant group in the calculation of the diversity indices. As a further robustness test we
29This corresponds to Table 1, Column 8 of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005)
30Actually, the variable representing the proportion of atheists/Non-religious in the population, is marginally
significant in some of the specifications but is not robust to the inclusion of a broader range of controls as in
Desmet et al. (2012)
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re-calculated our religious diversity measures including these groups. We find that when we
do not control for religious intolerance, and religious fractionalization and polarization enter
the specifications separately, both religious polarization and fractionalization are significant
(only) at the highest level of aggregation. But the sign is negative i.e. religious diversity (both
fractionalization and polarization) at the highest level of aggregation seems to reduce conflict.
This significance however, disappears when we control for religious intolerance.31
Further, unlike our other specifications if religious fractionalization and polarization
enter the specifications together, neither is significant. We argue that “since what we are trying
to capture is religious interaction, it is reasonable not to treat the no-religion group as other
religions because the only things that people in this group have in common is the fact they
do not belong to any religious group. Therefore, there are not specific common interests that
permit to identify them as a collective and that distinguish them from the interest of all the other
groups. This means that from a political point of view there is no common point of reference that
keeps them together. Moreover, the non-religious group does not have the necessity to reaffirm
its identity because, as a group, it has no identity. This means that social friction caused
by religious differences with other groups will not be present” (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2000)).
4 Conclusion
In this paper we create measures of religious diversity at three different levels of aggregation
corresponding to different historical depths of cleavages. We also construct a new measure of
religious intolerance. Using our newly constructed measures we do an in-depth empirical analysis
of the relation between religious diversity, intolerance and the probability of civil conflict.
Through our empirical analysis, we find that religious diversity is a significant and robust
correlate of civil conflict. Religious fractionalization significantly reduces conflict while religious
polarization significantly increases it. Moreover, religious intolerance is a significant and robust
correlate of civil conflict. In particular intolerance arising out of social and government regulation
of religion significantly leads to more conflict. We find no evidence in favour of the perception
that some religions are more violent than others, at least controlling explicitly for the percentage
of Christians and Muslims in the country. Neither is having more religious people or Non-
religious people in the country relevant for predicting civil conflict.
31These results are not provided and are available upon request.
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We also find that religious diversity measured at the second level of aggregation is the
most robust one. In other words, the cleavage between Hindus, Muslims, and Christians etc.
is more relevant than that between Abrahamic and Indian religions or that between different
denominations of Christians - like Protestants and Catholics, or of Muslims - like Shias and
Sunnis. Thinking in terms of Huntington (1993a), the relevant groups that define civilizations
which potentially clash are the groups like Hindus, Muslims, and Christians etc. as defined by
the second level of aggregation. On the other hand, thinking in terms of Caselli and Coleman
(2012), these religious identies or groups are seperated by an ethnic distance which imposes a
high enough cost on individuals of one group to pass themselves off as members of the other.
Our results are robust to a host of specifications, data and controls including controls
for other forms of ethnic diversity. We conclude from the above empirical analysis that both
religious diversity and intolerance are important predictors of civil conflict and must be taken
into account in any analysis investigating the correlates of civil conflict.
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A Figures
(a) Rel1 (b) Rel2 (c) Rel3
Figure A.1: Histograms
(a) Rel pol1 (b) Rel pol2 (c) Rel pol3
Figure A.2: Histograms Religious diversity
(a) Religious Fractionalization (b) Religious Polarization
Figure A.3: Densities Religious diversity
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(a) Level 1 (b) Level 2 (c) Level 3
Figure A.4: Scatter plots Religious diversity
Figure A.5: Religious Intolerance (no data for the U.S.)
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Figure A.6: Religious Fractionalization at Level 1
Figure A.7: Religious Fractionalization at Level 2
Figure A.8: Religious Fractionalization at Level 3
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Figure A.9: Religious Polarization at Level 1
Figure A.10: Religious Polarization at Level 2
Figure A.11: Religious Polarization at Level 3
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B Tables
Table B.1: Cross-correlation table Religious diversity and Intolerance (197 obs)
Variables rfrac1 rpol1 rfrac2 rpol2 rfrac3 rpol3
rpol1 0.991
rfrac2 0.823 0.813
rpol2 0.782 0.791 0.967
rfrac3 0.547 0.550 0.585 0.572
rpol3 0.502 0.515 0.586 0.628 0.782
Religious Intolerance -0.266 -0.286 -0.107 -0.118 -0.395 -0.244
Table B.2: Correlation with Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) measures (137 obs)
rfrac1 rpol1 rfrac2 rpol2 rfrac3 rpol3
ethpol 0.0256 0.0175 0.1026 0.0648 0.1542 0.1013
ethfrac 0.2659 0.2728 0.4165 0.381 0.2798 0.2539
relpol 0.5898 0.5957 0.6666 0.6564 0.487 0.5801
relfrac 0.6684 0.6597 0.7466 0.7133 0.499 0.5746
Table B.3: Correlation of religious diversity with Desmet et al. (2012) measures (208 obs)
rfrac1 rpol1 rfrac2 rpol2 rfrac3 rpol3
elf1 0.1445 0.1421 0.1782 0.1682 0.1363 0.1627
elf2 0.0706 0.069 0.1855 0.1797 0.1052 0.1741
elf3 0.1238 0.1088 0.2362 0.21 0.1015 0.1814
elf4 0.1439 0.1276 0.2745 0.2324 0.1352 0.1891
elf5 0.1334 0.1186 0.2805 0.2405 0.1113 0.1703
elf6 0.1036 0.0921 0.2664 0.2292 0.074 0.1621
elf7 0.1233 0.112 0.2829 0.2389 0.0803 0.1549
elf8 0.1115 0.1007 0.2733 0.2312 0.0754 0.1456
elf9 0.1822 0.178 0.3463 0.3034 0.1492 0.1865
elf10 0.2109 0.2099 0.3712 0.3297 0.2059 0.2091
elf11 0.2103 0.2111 0.3702 0.3288 0.2214 0.2102
elf12 0.2094 0.2103 0.3676 0.3265 0.2228 0.2129
elf13 0.2093 0.2102 0.3674 0.3264 0.2229 0.2129
elf14 0.2098 0.211 0.3665 0.326 0.2244 0.2167
elf15 0.2098 0.211 0.3664 0.3259 0.2244 0.2168
pol1 0.1324 0.1317 0.1742 0.1692 0.1245 0.1585
pol2 0.043 0.0431 0.1546 0.1532 0.0715 0.1568
pol3 0.0642 0.0548 0.1728 0.161 0.0684 0.1618
pol4 0.0898 0.0791 0.2064 0.1788 0.1063 0.172
pol5 0.0708 0.0587 0.1855 0.1655 0.0579 0.1363
pol6 0.0271 0.0168 0.1419 0.1267 0.0101 0.1114
pol7 -0.0025 -0.0138 0.1033 0.0936 -0.0232 0.0753
pol8 -0.0358 -0.047 0.0469 0.0371 -0.0781 0.0168
pol9 0.0208 0.0127 0.1123 0.1042 -0.0204 0.0537
pol10 0.0131 0.0034 0.0981 0.0939 -0.0456 0.0461
pol11 -0.0169 -0.0281 0.0529 0.0479 -0.1202 -0.0015
pol12 -0.0175 -0.029 0.0549 0.0495 -0.1269 -0.0085
pol13 -0.0173 -0.0288 0.0551 0.0498 -0.1274 -0.0087
pol14 -0.0169 -0.0284 0.0547 0.0496 -0.1266 -0.007
pol15 -0.017 -0.0285 0.0548 0.0496 -0.1268 -0.0075
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Table B.4: Cross-correlation table between groups and intolerance (197 obs)
Variables %Muslims %Christians %None/Atheists
%Christians -0.739
%None/Atheists -0.254 -0.118
Religious intolerance 0.560 -0.519 -0.057
Table B.5: Religious diversity and Conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rfrac1 rfrac2 rfrac3 pol1 pol2 pol3
rel -1.022 -0.548 0.0277 -0.485 -0.206 0.652
(0.714) (0.837) (0.728) (0.416) (0.554) (0.674)
Lagged civil war -0.850*** -0.854*** -0.851*** -0.847*** -0.847*** -0.866***
(0.256) (0.261) (0.259) (0.256) (0.259) (0.258)
Log lagged GDP/cap -0.616*** -0.621*** -0.617*** -0.618*** -0.621*** -0.605***
(0.149) (0.148) (0.148) (0.149) (0.148) (0.146)
Log lagged population 0.297*** 0.299*** 0.295*** 0.292*** 0.294*** 0.299***
(0.0727) (0.0726) (0.0704) (0.0717) (0.0708) (0.0708)
% mountainous 0.00853* 0.00895* 0.00883* 0.00849* 0.00903* 0.00785
(0.00494) (0.00479) (0.00491) (0.00495) (0.00482) (0.00507)
Noncontiguos state dummy 0.487 0.520 0.514 0.507 0.531 0.456
(0.354) (0.358) (0.361) (0.353) (0.364) (0.358)
Oil exporter dummy 0.724*** 0.751*** 0.728*** 0.730*** 0.746*** 0.721***
(0.239) (0.239) (0.239) (0.239) (0.241) (0.234)
New state dummy 1.777*** 1.769*** 1.775*** 1.777*** 1.770*** 1.785***
(0.371) (0.368) (0.370) (0.371) (0.367) (0.374)
Instability dummy 0.625*** 0.630*** 0.646*** 0.631*** 0.637*** 0.657***
(0.219) (0.216) (0.218) (0.219) (0.217) (0.217)
Democracy lagged (Polity 2) 0.0207 0.0195 0.0195 0.0206 0.0195 0.0203
(0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0207) (0.0210) (0.0209) (0.0211)
French legal origin dummy 1.160* 1.324* 1.478** 1.194* 1.363* 1.757**
(0.701) (0.697) (0.676) (0.711) (0.723) (0.723)
UK legal origin dummy 0.958 1.079 1.172* 0.981 1.091 1.380**
(0.698) (0.684) (0.660) (0.705) (0.701) (0.693)
Socialist legal origin dummy 1.096 1.212* 1.245* 1.095 1.210* 1.322*
(0.719) (0.710) (0.703) (0.726) (0.713) (0.705)
Latin America and Carribean Dummy 0.183 0.111 0.0969 0.171 0.105 -0.0132
(0.403) (0.395) (0.421) (0.402) (0.390) (0.422)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.394 0.335 0.143 0.369 0.257 -0.0494
(0.384) (0.475) (0.482) (0.390) (0.476) (0.413)
East and Southeast Asia Dummy 0.461 0.353 0.267 0.414 0.309 0.232
(0.347) (0.351) (0.335) (0.340) (0.342) (0.318)
Constant -3.904** -4.014** -4.203*** -3.873** -4.024** -4.800***
(1.629) (1.622) (1.610) (1.641) (1.650) (1.710)
Observations 5733 5733 5733 5733 5733 5733
Pseudo R2 0.098 0.097 0.096 0.098 0.097 0.098
ll -454.5 -455.1 -455.5 -454.8 -455.4 -454.6
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious
diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Desmet
et al. (2012) except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the
author’s own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.
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Table B.6: Religious diversity, religious intolerance & Conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rfrac1 rfrac2 rfrac3 pol1 pol2 pol3
rel -0.878 -0.525 0.377 -0.385 -0.147 0.758
(0.760) (0.812) (0.732) (0.441) (0.539) (0.633)
Rel intolerance 0.209** 0.221** 0.240** 0.210** 0.221** 0.241**
(0.104) (0.103) (0.111) (0.104) (0.105) (0.106)
Lagged civil war -0.900*** -0.902*** -0.899*** -0.897*** -0.896*** -0.913***
(0.246) (0.250) (0.244) (0.246) (0.247) (0.243)
Log lagged GDP/cap -0.537*** -0.538*** -0.537*** -0.538*** -0.539*** -0.517***
(0.159) (0.158) (0.156) (0.159) (0.158) (0.157)
Log lagged population 0.238*** 0.237*** 0.227*** 0.233*** 0.231*** 0.230***
(0.0853) (0.0861) (0.0824) (0.0842) (0.0841) (0.0827)
%mountainous 0.00755 0.00795 0.00735 0.00754 0.00795 0.00645
(0.00562) (0.00547) (0.00567) (0.00563) (0.00550) (0.00573)
Noncontiguos state dummy 0.609* 0.648* 0.643* 0.628* 0.656* 0.600*
(0.353) (0.354) (0.348) (0.351) (0.357) (0.349)
Oil exporter dummy 0.543** 0.566** 0.530** 0.550** 0.558** 0.522**
(0.256) (0.250) (0.248) (0.254) (0.251) (0.241)
New state dummy 1.728*** 1.720*** 1.726*** 1.728*** 1.723*** 1.736***
(0.381) (0.377) (0.380) (0.381) (0.377) (0.383)
Instability dummy 0.624*** 0.626*** 0.645*** 0.629*** 0.634*** 0.647***
(0.220) (0.217) (0.219) (0.220) (0.217) (0.219)
Democracy lagged (Polity 2) 0.0272 0.0265 0.0267 0.0271 0.0265 0.0284
(0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0206) (0.0207) (0.0206) (0.0209)
French legal origin dummy 0.996 1.102 1.297* 1.038 1.155 1.532*
(0.782) (0.776) (0.755) (0.789) (0.791) (0.820)
UK legal origin dummy 0.696 0.762 0.826 0.721 0.780 1.029
(0.789) (0.780) (0.758) (0.793) (0.789) (0.804)
Socialist legal origin dummy 1.011 1.091 1.102 1.015 1.090 1.186
(0.785) (0.780) (0.768) (0.789) (0.779) (0.786)
Latin America and Carribean Dummy 0.549 0.512 0.491 0.538 0.506 0.411
(0.409) (0.400) (0.403) (0.408) (0.395) (0.423)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.825* 0.829* 0.555 0.794* 0.729 0.479
(0.424) (0.492) (0.466) (0.428) (0.488) (0.443)
East and Southeast Asia Dummy 0.595 0.516 0.389 0.542 0.456 0.379
(0.385) (0.379) (0.360) (0.376) (0.372) (0.352)
Constant -4.029** -4.105** -4.337** -4.012** -4.120** -4.916***
(1.721) (1.723) (1.717) (1.732) (1.735) (1.826)
Observations 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678
Pseudo R2 0.102 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.103
ll -451.7 -452.1 -452.2 -452.0 -452.3 -451.2
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious
diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Desmet
et al. (2012) except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the
author’s own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.
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Table B.7: Civil conflict - Components of religious Intolerance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
r1 r2 r3 rr1 rr2 rr3
religious fractionalization -8.280 -2.859 -1.639 -10.02* -3.728* -1.178
(5.297) (2.100) (1.257) (5.739) (2.119) (1.274)
religious polarization 4.068 1.595 1.755* 4.990 2.094 1.434
(2.987) (1.314) (0.974) (3.157) (1.302) (0.981)
GRI: Government Regulation Index 0.108** 0.110** 0.0849
(0.0442) (0.0463) (0.0521)
Observations 5733 5733 5733 5678 5678 5678
Pseudo R2 0.100 0.098 0.101 0.104 0.102 0.102
ll -453.6 -454.5 -453.3 -450.6 -451.5 -451.5
religious fractionalization -8.280 -2.859 -1.639 -8.915 -3.246 -0.920
(5.297) (2.100) (1.257) (6.210) (2.126) (1.190)
religious polarization 4.068 1.595 1.755* 4.612 1.896 1.313
(2.987) (1.314) (0.974) (3.363) (1.333) (0.893)
SRI: Social Regulation Index 0.163*** 0.170*** 0.164***
(0.0530) (0.0525) (0.0559)
Observations 5733 5733 5733 5678 5678 5678
Pseudo R2 0.100 0.098 0.101 0.109 0.108 0.109
ll -453.6 -454.5 -453.3 -448.2 -448.5 -448.2
religious fractionalization -8.280 -2.859 -1.639 -8.501 -3.036 -1.425
(5.297) (2.100) (1.257) (5.412) (2.134) (1.275)
religious polarization 4.068 1.595 1.755* 4.190 1.716 1.662*
(2.987) (1.314) (0.974) (3.055) (1.344) (0.967)
GFI: Government Favoritism Index 0.0110 0.0145 0.0146
(0.0505) (0.0517) (0.0517)
Observations 5733 5733 5733 5678 5678 5678
Pseudo R2 0.100 0.098 0.101 0.100 0.098 0.100
ll -453.6 -454.5 -453.3 -452.8 -453.7 -452.7
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond
to religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All
the data are from Desmet et al. (2012) except for the measures of religious diversity and
religious intolerance which are based on the author’s own calculations using data from myriad
sources explained in detail in the data section.
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Table B.8: Ethnic conflict: Components of religious intolerance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
r1 r2 r3 rr1 rr2 rr3
religious fractionalization -6.509 -4.036 -1.708 -8.558 -5.264** -1.098
(6.466) (2.485) (1.762) (7.202) (2.591) (1.857)
religious polarization 2.970 2.502 2.299* 4.125 3.283** 1.896
(3.606) (1.578) (1.267) (3.953) (1.629) (1.352)
GRI: Government Regulation Index 0.115** 0.136** 0.0999
(0.0548) (0.0563) (0.0652)
Observations 5733 5733 5733 5678 5678 5678
Pseudo R2 0.153 0.153 0.156 0.159 0.160 0.160
ll -320.1 -320.1 -318.9 -317.5 -316.9 -317.0
religious fractionalization -6.509 -4.036 -1.708 -7.237 -4.407* -0.951
(6.466) (2.485) (1.762) (7.481) (2.586) (1.757)
religious polarization 2.970 2.502 2.299* 3.618 2.820* 1.897
(3.606) (1.578) (1.267) (4.093) (1.665) (1.247)
SRI: Social Regulation Index 0.135** 0.150** 0.148**
(0.0639) (0.0656) (0.0701)
Observations 5733 5733 5733 5678 5678 5678
Pseudo R2 0.153 0.153 0.156 0.160 0.162 0.164
ll -320.1 -320.1 -318.9 -317.0 -316.3 -315.6
religious fractionalization -6.509 -4.036 -1.708 -5.167 -3.591 -1.540
(6.466) (2.485) (1.762) (6.336) (2.370) (1.790)
religious polarization 2.970 2.502 2.299* 2.144 2.117 2.035
(3.606) (1.578) (1.267) (3.532) (1.545) (1.247)
GFI: Government Favoritism Index -0.0918 -0.0751 -0.0725
(0.0702) (0.0727) (0.0751)
Observations 5733 5733 5733 5678 5678 5678
Pseudo R2 0.153 0.153 0.156 0.157 0.156 0.158
ll -320.1 -320.1 -318.9 -318.0 -318.3 -317.5
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the onset of ethnic conflict. Column 1(4) , 2(5) and 3(6) correspond
to religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All
the data are from Desmet et al. (2012) except for the measures of religious diversity and
religious intolerance which are based on the author’s own calculations using data from myriad
sources explained in detail in the data section.
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Table B.9: Controlling for percentage of different groups (Aggregation Level 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Religious fractionalization -2.891 -2.932 -2.979 -3.048 -2.966 -2.982 -3.048
(2.130) (2.095) (2.076) (2.100) (2.124) (2.077) (2.101)
Religious polarization 1.783 1.760 1.584 1.802 1.919 1.651 1.793
(1.341) (1.298) (1.284) (1.304) (1.326) (1.337) (1.343)
Percentage Nonreligious/Atheists -0.00995 -0.0112 -0.00922 -0.0112
(0.00957) (0.00918) (0.00958) (0.00956)
Percentage Muslims 0.00359 0.00325 0.00127 -0.000181
(0.00356) (0.00359) (0.00579) (0.00561)
Percentage Christians -0.00433 -0.00478 -0.00335 -0.00492
(0.00388) (0.00386) (0.00628) (0.00608)
Observations 5733 5733 5733 5733 5733 5733 5733
Pseudo R2 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.101 0.100 0.099 0.101
ll -454.0 -454.1 -453.9 -453.2 -453.6 -453.9 -453.2
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious
diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Desmet et al.
(2012) except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the author’s
own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section. The other controls
are: a constant term, lagged civil war, the log of per capita GDP (lagged), the percentage of the country that is
mountainous, non-contiguous state dummy, oil exporter dummy, new state dummy, Instability dummy, democracy
lagged (polity2), continent dummy variables for Sub-Saharan Africa, East and Southeast Asia, Latin America
and the Caribbean, and legal origin dummies from La Porta et al. (1999).
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Table B.10: Controlling ETHFRAC and ETHPOL in Desmet et al. (2012)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6
Religious fractionalization 2 -4.150* -4.130* -3.998* -3.879 -3.360 -3.642
(2.261) (2.247) (2.264) (2.582) (2.474) (2.729)
Religious polarization 2 2.426* 2.402* 2.302* 2.029 1.733 1.884
(1.388) (1.380) (1.396) (1.700) (1.642) (1.765)
elf1 0.972* -2.818
(0.573) (3.200)
Religious intolerance 0.221** 0.219** 0.222** 0.196 0.172 0.179
(0.105) (0.105) (0.106) (0.120) (0.120) (0.127)
pol1 0.607* 2.208
(0.330) (1.748)
Ethnic fractionalization MRQ 0.508 0.333
(0.546) (0.761)
Ethnic polarization MRQ 0.531 0.345
(0.549) (0.769)
Observations 5678 5678 5678 4898 4898 4898
Pseudo R2 0.106 0.106 0.107 0.104 0.104 0.104
ll -449.7 -449.5 -449.3 -391.6 -391.6 -391.5
Religious fractionalization 3 -1.113 -1.099 -1.044 -2.304* -2.272* -2.266*
(1.287) (1.292) (1.301) (1.248) (1.212) (1.210)
Religious polarization 3 1.402 1.377 1.322 2.488** 2.435** 2.435**
(0.966) (0.970) (0.975) (1.055) (1.030) (1.027)
elf1 0.768 -2.744
(0.593) (3.398)
Religious intolerance 0.184 0.182 0.189* 0.141 0.119 0.118
(0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.113) (0.117) (0.118)
pol1 0.487 2.045
(0.340) (1.873)
Ethnic fractionalization MRQ 0.199 -0.0508
(0.522) (0.720)
Ethnic polarization MRQ 0.472 0.501
(0.598) (0.802)
Observations 5678 5678 5678 4898 4898 4898
Pseudo R2 0.105 0.106 0.106 0.107 0.108 0.108
ll -450.0 -449.8 -449.6 -390.0 -389.7 -389.7
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6)
correspond to religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation
respectively. All the data are from Desmet et al. (2012) except for the measures of religious
diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the author’s own calculations using
data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.
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Table B.11: Components of intolerance in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Level1 Level2 Level3 Level1 Level2 Level3
religious fractionalization -33.14*** -11.39*** -3.563* -47.53** -14.44*** -2.859
(12.55) (3.765) (1.923) (20.52) (4.464) (2.223)
Religious polarization 15.68** 6.924*** 3.809** 23.14** 8.855*** 3.566*
(6.803) (2.296) (1.806) (10.86) (2.866) (2.002)
ETHPOL 2.175** 2.276** 2.360** 2.051* 1.935* 2.134*
(1.088) (1.109) (1.132) (1.134) (1.148) (1.192)
ETHFRAC 0.257 0.526 0.270 0.996 1.440 0.602
(0.920) (0.968) (1.004) (0.986) (0.988) (1.044)
Government Regulation Index 0.179* 0.201** 0.151*
(0.0947) (0.0937) (0.0915)
N 846 846 846 838 838 838
pseudo R2 0.178 0.154 0.157 0.210 0.191 0.176
ll -294.1 -302.7 -301.5 -281.8 -288.4 -293.8
religious fractionalization -33.14*** -11.39*** -3.563* -50.09** -12.80*** -2.030
(12.55) (3.765) (1.923) (24.49) (4.140) (1.966)
Religious polarization 15.68** 6.924*** 3.809** 24.60* 7.932*** 3.207*
(6.803) (2.296) (1.806) (12.83) (2.731) (1.709)
ETHPOL 2.175** 2.276** 2.360** 1.927* 1.908* 1.850*
(1.088) (1.109) (1.132) (1.086) (1.075) (1.115)
ETHFRAC 0.257 0.526 0.270 1.020 1.248 0.480
(0.920) (0.968) (1.004) (1.019) (0.984) (1.038)
Social Regulation Index 0.222** 0.248*** 0.246***
(0.0986) (0.0916) (0.0910)
N 846 846 846 838 838 838
pseudo R2 0.178 0.154 0.157 0.226 0.217 0.211
ll -294.1 -302.7 -301.5 -275.7 -279.2 -281.3
religious fractionalization -33.14*** -11.39*** -3.563* -39.72*** -12.80*** -2.720
(12.55) (3.765) (1.923) (14.68) (4.038) (2.005)
Religious polarization 15.68** 6.924*** 3.809** 19.30** 8.068*** 3.505*
(6.803) (2.296) (1.806) (7.938) (2.633) (1.875)
ETHPOL 2.175** 2.276** 2.360** 2.139* 2.135* 2.190*
(1.088) (1.109) (1.132) (1.162) (1.161) (1.162)
ETHFRAC 0.257 0.526 0.270 0.553 0.981 0.461
(0.920) (0.968) (1.004) (0.961) (0.997) (1.023)
Government Favoritism Index 0.0802 0.114 0.0990
(0.0962) (0.0962) (0.0999)
N 846 846 846 838 838 838
pseudo R2 0.178 0.154 0.157 0.191 0.171 0.164
ll -294.1 -302.7 -301.5 -288.5 -295.6 -297.9
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the incidence of civil war (intermediate and high-intensity civil wars
of PRIO). Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious diversity measured at the 1st,
2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2005) except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the
author’s own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.
The sample is divided into 5 year periods. The other controls are: a constant term, the log of per
capita GDP, the log of population (both at the beginning of the period), the percentage of the
country that is mountainous, non-contiguous state dummy, level of democracy (Polity IV dataset).
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Table B.12: Controlling for percentage of different groups in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005)
(Aggregation Level 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7
Religious polarization 8.151*** 8.948*** 8.970*** 8.237*** 8.978*** 8.155*** 8.165***
(2.808) (2.914) (2.871) (2.782) (2.877) (2.776) (2.717)
religious fractionalization -12.58*** -14.56*** -14.19*** -12.57*** -14.45*** -12.90*** -12.88***
(4.117) (4.462) (4.370) (4.109) (4.566) (4.108) (4.200)
LGDPC -0.124 -0.286 -0.283 -0.159 -0.294 -0.168 -0.169
(0.242) (0.235) (0.258) (0.263) (0.248) (0.237) (0.250)
LPOP 0.438*** 0.306* 0.335** 0.445*** 0.316* 0.419** 0.420**
(0.166) (0.171) (0.168) (0.167) (0.187) (0.166) (0.178)
PRIMEXP -1.559 -1.036 -1.117 -1.516 -1.046 -1.408 -1.409
(1.731) (1.622) (1.709) (1.761) (1.633) (1.658) (1.658)
MOUNTAINS -0.00765 -0.00886 -0.00846 -0.00935 -0.00920 -0.0107 -0.0108
(0.0105) (0.0115) (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0114) (0.0117) (0.0118)
NONCONT 0.0218 0.0257 0.00640 -0.0121 0.0105 -0.00224 -0.00513
(0.573) (0.545) (0.547) (0.575) (0.545) (0.568) (0.572)
DEMOCRACY 0.242 0.229 0.285 0.214 0.239 0.119 0.121
(0.382) (0.396) (0.410) (0.393) (0.383) (0.380) (0.368)
ETHPOL 2.264* 1.783 1.853 2.301** 1.819 2.265* 2.270*
(1.191) (1.142) (1.137) (1.173) (1.163) (1.172) (1.195)
ETHFRAC 1.097 1.485 1.358 0.979 1.417 1.082 1.069
(1.040) (1.000) (1.015) (1.049) (1.071) (1.023) (1.116)
Rel intolerance 0.366* 0.525** 0.519*** 0.433** 0.540*** 0.464** 0.467**
(0.187) (0.229) (0.188) (0.182) (0.209) (0.221) (0.201)
Percentage Nonreligious/Atheists -0.0336* -0.0337 -0.0362* -0.0361*
(0.0202) (0.0205) (0.0209) (0.0212)
Percentage Muslims -0.00489 -0.00345 -0.00656 -0.00629
(0.00697) (0.0105) (0.00712) (0.0103)
Percentage Christians 0.00454 0.00421 0.00243 0.000458
(0.00659) (0.00629) (0.0101) (0.00960)
cons -9.723*** -6.240* -7.181** -9.748*** -6.537* -8.733*** -8.781**
(3.159) (3.197) (2.925) (3.153) (3.509) (3.317) (3.517)
N 838 838 838 838 838 838 838
pseudo R2 0.213 0.204 0.204 0.215 0.204 0.217 0.217
ll -280.5 -283.8 -283.9 -279.9 -283.7 -279.2 -279.2
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond
to religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the
data are from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) except for the measures of religious diversity
and religious intolerance which are based on the author’s own calculations using data from myriad
sources explained in detail in the data section.
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Table B.13: List of Religions
Religion Level 1 Religion Level 2 Religion Level 3
Abrahamic Baha’i Baha’i
Abrahamic Christian African Christian
Abrahamic Christian African Methodist Episcopal
Abrahamic Christian African Protestant
Abrahamic Christian Aglipayan
Abrahamic Christian Albanian Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Anglican
Abrahamic Christian Apostolic Faith
Abrahamic Christian Armenian Apostolic (Orthodox)
Abrahamic Christian Armenian Gregorian
Abrahamic Christian Assemblies of God
Abrahamic Christian Baptist
Abrahamic Christian Belarusian Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Black Independent Churches
Abrahamic Christian Bulgarian Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Roman Catholic
Abrahamic Christian Christian
Abrahamic Christian Christian unaffiliated
Abrahamic Christian Church of Christ
Abrahamic Christian Congregational
Abrahamic Christian Coptic Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Czechoslovak Hussite
Abrahamic Christian Dutch Reformed Church
Abrahamic Christian Eastern Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Eritrean Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Estonian Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Ethiopian Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren
Abrahamic Christian Evangelical Lutheran
Abrahamic Christian Evangelical Protestant
Abrahamic Christian Free Wesleyan
Abrahamic Christian Full Gospel
Abrahamic Christian Georgian Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Greek Catholic (Melchite)
Abrahamic Christian Greek Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Independent
Abrahamic Christian Kimbanguist
Abrahamic Christian Lutheran
Abrahamic Christian Methodist
Abrahamic Christian Mormon
Abrahamic Christian New Apostolic
Abrahamic Christian Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Other Apostolic
Abrahamic Christian Other Black Independent
Abrahamic Christian Other Christian
Abrahamic Christian other Protestant
Abrahamic Christian Pentecostal
Abrahamic Christian Polish Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Presbyterian
Abrahamic Christian Protestant
Abrahamic Christian Reformed Churches
Abrahamic Christian Romanian Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Russian Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Salvation Army
Abrahamic Christian Serbian Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Seventh Day Adventist
Abrahamic Christian Silesian Evangelical
Abrahamic Christian Slovak Evangelical
Abrahamic Christian Swiss Christian
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Table B.14: List of Religions
Religion Level 1 Religion Level 2 Religion Level 3
Abrahamic Christian Ukrainian Catholic
Abrahamic Christian Ukrainian Orthodox (Autocephalous)
Abrahamic Christian Ukrainian Orthodox (Kiev)
Abrahamic Christian Ukrainian Orthodox (Russian)
Abrahamic Christian United Congregational
Abrahamic Christian Uniting Church
Abrahamic Druze Druze
Abrahamic Jewish Jewish
Abrahamic Muslim Ibadiyah Muslim
Abrahamic Muslim Muslim
Abrahamic Muslim other Muslim
Abrahamic Muslim Shii Muslim
Abrahamic Muslim Sunni Muslim
Indian Buddhist Buddhist
Indian Buddhist Hoa Hao
Indian Buddhist Lamaistic Buddhist
Indian Buddhist Tantric Buddhist
Indian Hindu Hindu
Indian Jain Jain
Indian Sikh Sikh
Indigenous Animist Animist
Indigenous Buddhist and Taoism Buddhist and Taoism
Indigenous Burkinan Traditional Burkinan Traditional
Indigenous Chinese Folk Chinese Folk
Indigenous Chondogyo Chondogyo
Indigenous Confucian Confucian
Indigenous Ethnic Religionist Ethnic Religionist
Indigenous Indigenous Indigenous
Indigenous GB Traditional GB Traditional
Indigenous Hsuan Yuan Chiao Hsuan Yuan Chiao
Indigenous Indigenous Cao Dai
Indigenous Indigenous I Kuan Tao
Indigenous Indigenous Tien Te Chiao
Indigenous Ivoirian Traditional Ivoirian Traditional
Indigenous Laos Traditional Laos Traditional
Indigenous Madagascar Traditional Madagascar Traditional
Indigenous Malawi Traditional Malawi Traditional
Indigenous Modekngei (Indigenous) Modekngei (Indigenous)
Indigenous Mozambique Traditional Mozambique Traditional
Indigenous Myanmar Traditional Myanmar Traditional
Indigenous Niger Traditional Niger Traditional
Indigenous Nigeria Traditional Nigeria Traditional
Indigenous NK Traditional NK Traditional
Indigenous Ratana Ratana
Indigenous Senegal Traditional Senegal Traditional
Indigenous Shintoist Shintoist
Indigenous SL Traditional SL Traditional
Indigenous Swaziland Traditional Swaziland Traditional
Indigenous Tanzania Traditional Tanzania Traditional
Indigenous Taoist Taoist
Indigenous Togo Traditional Togo Traditional
Indigenous Traditional Traditional
Indigenous Voodoo Voodoo
Indigenous Wonbulgyo Wonbulgyo
Indigenous Zambia Traditional Zambia Traditional
Indigenous Zimbabwe Traditional Zimbabwe Traditional
Iranian Zoroastrian Zoroastrian
Other New Religionist New Religionist
Other Other Other
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Table B.15: Ranking of countries by religious fractionalization (High to Low)
Ranks rfrac1 rfrac2 rfrac3
1 Macau Benin Jamaica
2 China Singapore Antigua and Barbuda
3 Mongolia Taiwan Papua New Guinea
4 Singapore Malawi New Zealand
5 Taiwan Cote d’Ivoire Trinidad and Tobago
6 Laos Tanzania South Africa
7 Japan Nigeria Guyana
8 Vietnam Suriname Malawi
9 Mauritius Macau Ghana
10 Korea, South Mauritius Vanuatu
11 Trinidad and Tobago Zimbabwe Benin
12 Togo Cameroon Solomon Islands
13 Angola Central African Republic United States
14 Estonia Togo Samoa
15 French Guiana China American Samoa
16 Benin Guinea-Bissau Lebanon
17 Tonga Malaysia Bahamas, The
18 Guinea-Bissau Mongolia Bermuda
19 Malawi Trinidad and Tobago Zambia
20 Isle of Man Lebanon Saint Kitts and Nevis
21 Guyana Chad Barbados
22 Suriname Korea, North Kenya
23 Madagascar Guyana Fiji
24 Central African Republic Burkina Faso Suriname
25 Tanzania Brunei Australia
26 Botswana Laos Mozambique
27 Brunei Japan Moldova
28 Kenya Sierra Leone Nigeria
29 Cuba Vietnam Cameroon
30 Congo, Republic of the Kenya Botswana
31 Malaysia Korea, South Central African Republic
32 Sierra Leone Eritrea Lesotho
33 Lesotho Madagascar Swaziland
34 Slovenia Angola Ukraine
35 Hong Kong Estonia Grenadine
36 Fiji French Guiana Cote d’Ivoire
37 Czech Republic Fiji Tanzania
38 American Samoa Bosnia and Herzegovina Nauru
39 Cote d’Ivoire Ethiopia Singapore
40 New Zealand Liberia Congo, Democratic Republic of the
41 Zimbabwe Burundi Taiwan
42 Cameroon Sri Lanka Virgin Islands
43 Nigeria Tonga Mauritius
44 Burundi Russia Uganda
45 Northern Mariana Islands Isle of Man Netherlands
46 Namibia Mozambique Belize
47 Liberia Macedonia Zimbabwe
48 Sudan Congo, Republic of the Congo, Republic of the
49 Jamaica Botswana Namibia
50 CZECHOSLOVAKIA Slovenia Gabon
51 Liechtenstein Cuba Ethiopia
52 Vanuatu Sudan Togo
53 Faroe Islands Ghana Palau
54 Burkina Faso East Timor Macau
55 Belize Kuwait Guernsey
56 India Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina
57 Sri Lanka Lesotho Jersey
58 Bermuda Hong Kong Germany
59 Nauru New Zealand Latvia
60 Palau Czech Republic Vietnam
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Ranking of countries by religious fractionalization (High to Low)
Ranks rfrac1 rfrac2 rfrac3
61 Zambia American Samoa Chad
62 Qatar Israel Grenada
63 Saint Kitts and Nevis Gabon Korea, South
64 Kuwait Bhutan Canada
65 Hungary Qatar Tonga
66 Guam Yugoslavia Estonia
67 Sweden Congo, Democratic Republic of the Angola
68 Dominican Republic Moldova Marshall Islands
69 Bangladesh Northern Mariana Islands Kuwait
70 Niger India New Caledonia
71 Moldova Namibia China
72 Swaziland Montenegro Eritrea
73 French Polynesia West Bank Rwanda
74 Gabon Bahrain Guinea-Bissau
75 Burma (Myanmar) Zambia Uruguay
76 Guernsey Kazakhstan Switzerland
77 Chad Cyprus Hungary
78 Congo, Democratic Republic of the Jamaica Malaysia
79 Ghana CZECHOSLOVAKIA Mongolia
80 San Marino Nepal Burkina Faso
81 Mali Liechtenstein Northern Mariana Islands
82 Mozambique Sweden Kiribati
83 Oman Vanuatu Korea, North
84 Norway Faroe Islands Bahrain
85 Panama Belize United Kingdom
86 Bahrain Guinea French Polynesia
87 Guinea Bermuda Dominica
88 Virgin Islands Nauru Brunei
89 Korea, North Palau Burundi
90 Grenadine Netherlands Laos
91 Australia Uganda Micronesia
92 Lithuania Panama Japan
93 Barbados Saint Kitts and Nevis Sierra Leone
94 Thailand Indonesia Cuba
95 Aruba Hungary Russia
96 Nepal Oman Madagascar
97 Costa Rica Guam Guatemala
98 Chile Palestine Yemen
99 New Caledonia Bulgaria Slovenia
100 Equatorial Guinea Swaziland Czech Republic
101 Ecuador Bangladesh French Guiana
102 Austria Dominican Republic Azerbaijan
103 United Arab Emirates Syria Belarus
104 Iceland Niger Liberia
105 Micronesia Burma (Myanmar) Sri Lanka
106 Sao Tome Reunion Iraq
107 Israel Georgia Isle of Man
108 Netherlands French Polynesia Macedonia
109 Seychelles Grenadine Saint Lucia
110 Slovakia Gambia, The El Salvador
111 Cambodia Mali CZECHOSLOVAKIA
112 Peru Norway Albania
113 Canada Guernsey Nicaragua
114 Ethiopia Egypt Panama
115 Papua New Guinea San Marino Yugoslavia
116 Indonesia France Oman
117 Pakistan Austria Sudan
118 Lebanon Australia East Timor
119 Haiti Kosovo Hong Kong
120 Guatemala Equatorial Guinea Guam
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Ranking of countries by religious fractionalization (High to Low)
Ranks rfrac1 rfrac2 rfrac3
121 Martinique Jordan Puerto Rico
122 Honduras New Caledonia Israel
123 El Salvador Belgium Sweden
124 Argentina Kyrgyzstan Chile
125 Solomon Islands Virgin Islands Liechtenstein
126 Brazil Philippines Syria
127 United States Azerbaijan Pakistan
128 Ireland Switzerland Bhutan
129 Guadeloupe Lithuania Qatar
130 Antigua and Barbuda Senegal Montenegro
131 Puerto Rico Barbados Slovakia
132 Nicaragua United States Cyprus
133 Gambia, The Djibouti Costa Rica
134 Venezuela Germany Brazil
135 Denmark Canada Haiti
136 Jordan Aruba Bolivia
137 Iran Thailand United Arab Emirates
138 Eritrea Pakistan Philippines
139 Paraguay Denmark India
140 Samoa Costa Rica Afghanistan
141 Philippines Chile Dominican Republic
142 Colombia Seychelles West Bank
143 Azerbaijan Argentina Kazakhstan
144 Kiribati Rwanda Bulgaria
145 Uganda Grenada Seychelles
146 Dominica Serbia and Montenegro Nepal
147 Macedonia United Kingdom Equatorial Guinea
148 Grenada Ecuador Netherlands Antilles
149 United Kingdom Kiribati Peru
150 France United Arab Emirates Aruba
151 Netherlands Antilles Iceland Georgia
152 Uruguay Libya Faroe Islands
153 Mayotte Micronesia Guinea
154 Armenia Sao Tome Austria
155 Libya Slovakia Norway
156 Switzerland Papua New Guinea Martinique
157 Portugal Mayotte Romania
158 Saint Lucia Cambodia Honduras
159 Andorra Saint Lucia Sao Tome
160 Marshall Islands Peru Indonesia
161 Tunisia Serbia Lithuania
162 Senegal Saudi Arabia Argentina
163 Afghanistan Dominica Belgium
164 Croatia Puerto Rico Palestine
165 Yemen Haiti Bangladesh
166 Bahamas, The Guatemala France
167 Georgia Martinique Serbia and Montenegro
168 Greece Iraq Iceland
169 Jersey Honduras San Marino
170 South Africa El Salvador Niger
171 Montenegro Turkmenistan Guadeloupe
172 Mauritania Luxembourg Iran
173 Tuvalu Solomon Islands Burma (Myanmar)
174 Bolivia Croatia Reunion
175 Malta Brazil Serbia
176 Germany Monaco Gambia, The
177 Mexico Ireland Mali
178 Saudi Arabia Netherlands Antilles Egypt
179 Turkey Guadeloupe Paraguay
180 Morocco Antigua and Barbuda Kosovo
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Ranking of countries by religious fractionalization (High to Low)
Ranks rfrac1 rfrac2 rfrac3
181 Somalia Ukraine Mexico
182 Finland Nicaragua Jordan
183 Rwanda Tunisia Colombia
184 Serbia and Montenegro Greece Ecuador
185 Gaza Strip Colombia Tajikistan
186 Poland Venezuela Croatia
187 Tajikistan Iran Ireland
188 Serbia Comoros Kyrgyzstan
189 Egypt Paraguay Saudi Arabia
190 Palestine Samoa Portugal
191 Bulgaria Uruguay Monaco
192 Syria Spain Andorra
193 Cyprus Andorra Luxembourg
194 Russia Tajikistan Senegal
195 Western Sahara Tuvalu Djibouti
196 Maldives Italy Thailand
197 Algeria Armenia Armenia
198 Uzbekistan South Africa Denmark
199 Italy Belarus Malta
200 Spain Portugal Venezuela
201 Comoros Yemen Cape Verde
202 Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Libya
203 Cape Verde Marshall Islands Mayotte
204 Luxembourg Malta Cambodia
205 Djibouti Afghanistan Tuvalu
206 Monaco Mauritania Turkmenistan
207 Kyrgyzstan Romania Finland
208 Kosovo Bahamas, The Poland
209 Reunion Gaza Strip Tunisia
210 Belgium Jersey Greece
211 Romania Bolivia Comoros
212 West Bank Mexico Spain
213 Kazakhstan Algeria Italy
214 Belarus Turkey Uzbekistan
215 Ukraine Morocco Mauritania
216 Yugoslavia Somalia Algeria
217 Bhutan Finland Gaza Strip
218 Albania Poland Turkey
219 Bosnia and Herzegovina Western Sahara Morocco
220 East Timor Maldives Somalia
221 Iraq Cape Verde Western Sahara
222 Latvia Latvia Maldives
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Table B.16: Ranking of countries by religious polarization (High to Low)
Ranks rpol1 rpol2 rpol3
1 Togo Angola French Guiana
2 Angola Estonia Yemen
3 Estonia French Guiana Isle of Man
4 French Guiana Bosnia and Herzegovina Guatemala
5 Mauritius Eritrea Korea, North
6 Korea, South Korea, South Japan
7 Tonga Tonga Micronesia
8 Guinea-Bissau Isle of Man Guinea-Bissau
9 Isle of Man Korea, North Switzerland
10 Taiwan Japan Russia
11 Japan Russia Tonga
12 Vietnam Guinea-Bissau Mongolia
13 Madagascar Vietnam Angola
14 Mongolia Botswana Eritrea
15 Central African Republic Mongolia Latvia
16 Tanzania Central African Republic Iraq
17 Botswana Togo Laos
18 Macau Ethiopia Cuba
19 Laos Macau Macedonia
20 Singapore Laos Kiribati
21 Cuba Chad Korea, South
22 Congo, Republic of the Tanzania French Polynesia
23 China Cuba Congo, Republic of the
24 Kenya Macedonia Sierra Leone
25 Guyana Congo, Republic of the Macau
26 Sierra Leone Lebanon East Timor
27 Lesotho Cameroon Bosnia and Herzegovina
28 Slovenia Sierra Leone Ethiopia
29 Suriname Zimbabwe Uruguay
30 Fiji Mauritius Germany
31 Czech Republic Nigeria Slovenia
32 American Samoa Kenya Vietnam
33 Trinidad and Tobago East Timor Estonia
34 Malaysia Albania Tanzania
35 Malawi Slovenia Virgin Islands
36 Benin Guyana Canada
37 Zimbabwe Lesotho Czech Republic
38 Cameroon Fiji Azerbaijan
39 Burundi Cote d’Ivoire Rwanda
40 Cote d’Ivoire Madagascar Northern Mariana Islands
41 Hong Kong Suriname China
42 New Zealand Burkina Faso Gabon
43 Brunei China Uganda
44 Nigeria Taiwan Nauru
45 Northern Mariana Islands Czech Republic Madagascar
46 Namibia American Samoa Jersey
47 Liberia Trinidad and Tobago Guernsey
48 Jamaica Malawi Burundi
49 CZECHOSLOVAKIA Burundi Togo
50 Sudan Benin El Salvador
51 Liechtenstein Mozambique Marshall Islands
52 Faroe Islands Liberia Nicaragua
53 Belize Malaysia Burkina Faso
54 Burkina Faso Bhutan Palau
55 Bermuda Singapore Taiwan
56 Nauru Sri Lanka Mauritius
57 India Brunei Chad
58 Sri Lanka New Zealand Bahrain
59 Zambia Ghana Central African Republic
60 Vanuatu Hong Kong Liberia
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Ranking of countries by religious polarization (High to Low)
Ranks rpol1 rpol2 rpol3
61 Saint Kitts and Nevis Sudan Cote d’Ivoire
62 Qatar Yugoslavia Cameroon
63 Palau Kuwait Zimbabwe
64 Kuwait Israel New Caledonia
65 Hungary Northern Mariana Islands Hungary
66 Guam Gabon Namibia
67 Sweden Qatar Albania
68 Dominican Republic Namibia Malaysia
69 Bangladesh Montenegro Bhutan
70 Niger Kazakhstan Lesotho
71 Moldova Cyprus Botswana
72 Swaziland Congo, Democratic Republic of the Yugoslavia
73 French Polynesia Jamaica Ukraine
74 Gabon CZECHOSLOVAKIA Congo, Democratic Republic of the
75 Guernsey Moldova Belarus
76 Congo, Democratic Republic of the Liechtenstein United Kingdom
77 Burma (Myanmar) Zambia Swaziland
78 Ghana India Netherlands
79 San Marino Faroe Islands Kuwait
80 Chad West Bank Sri Lanka
81 Mali Belize Brunei
82 Mozambique Bahrain Grenadine
83 Oman Bermuda Grenada
84 Norway Nauru Singapore
85 Panama Nepal Suriname
86 Virgin Islands Sweden Sudan
87 Guinea Vanuatu CZECHOSLOVAKIA
88 Bahrain Saint Kitts and Nevis Moldova
89 Korea, North Guinea Hong Kong
90 Grenadine Uganda Belize
91 Australia Palau Mozambique
92 Lithuania Hungary Guam
93 Barbados Netherlands Saint Kitts and Nevis
94 Thailand Guam Pakistan
95 Aruba Bulgaria Panama
96 Nepal Indonesia Nigeria
97 Costa Rica Panama Oman
98 Chile Swaziland Liechtenstein
99 New Caledonia Dominican Republic Bermuda
100 Equatorial Guinea Oman Dominica
101 Ecuador Bangladesh Israel
102 Austria Niger Kenya
103 United Arab Emirates Palestine Montenegro
104 Iceland Reunion American Samoa
105 Micronesia Syria Chile
106 Sao Tome French Polynesia Cyprus
107 Israel Georgia Fiji
108 Netherlands Guernsey Australia
109 Slovakia Egypt Zambia
110 Seychelles Burma (Myanmar) Saint Lucia
111 Peru Mali Puerto Rico
112 Cambodia Gambia, The Qatar
113 Papua New Guinea Norway Barbados
114 Canada San Marino Afghanistan
115 Ethiopia Grenadine United States
116 Indonesia Kosovo Lebanon
117 Lebanon France Brazil
118 Haiti Austria Bahamas, The
119 Pakistan Australia Sweden
120 Martinique Equatorial Guinea Costa Rica
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Ranking of countries by religious polarization (High to Low)
Ranks rpol1 rpol2 rpol3
121 Guatemala Jordan Bolivia
122 Honduras New Caledonia Samoa
123 El Salvador Belgium Syria
124 Argentina Kyrgyzstan Solomon Islands
125 Solomon Islands Virgin Islands United Arab Emirates
126 Brazil Philippines Benin
127 Ireland Azerbaijan Malawi
128 United States Switzerland Ghana
129 Guadeloupe Lithuania Vanuatu
130 Antigua and Barbuda Barbados Slovakia
131 Puerto Rico Djibouti Kazakhstan
132 Nicaragua Germany Dominican Republic
133 Gambia, The Senegal Haiti
134 Venezuela United States Faroe Islands
135 Eritrea Aruba West Bank
136 Iran Canada Guyana
137 Denmark Thailand Bulgaria
138 Jordan Costa Rica India
139 Paraguay Chile New Zealand
140 Samoa Pakistan Peru
141 Philippines Denmark Trinidad and Tobago
142 Azerbaijan Rwanda Philippines
143 Colombia Seychelles Nepal
144 Kiribati Argentina South Africa
145 Dominica Serbia and Montenegro Papua New Guinea
146 Uganda Grenada Georgia
147 Macedonia United Kingdom Guinea
148 Grenada Ecuador Seychelles
149 United Kingdom United Arab Emirates Netherlands Antilles
150 France Iceland Equatorial Guinea
151 Netherlands Antilles Kiribati Antigua and Barbuda
152 Uruguay Micronesia Aruba
153 Mayotte Sao Tome Austria
154 Armenia Libya Norway
155 Libya Slovakia Honduras
156 Switzerland Papua New Guinea Martinique
157 Saint Lucia Mayotte Romania
158 Portugal Peru Lithuania
159 Andorra Serbia Indonesia
160 Marshall Islands Saint Lucia Sao Tome
161 Afghanistan Cambodia Belgium
162 Senegal Saudi Arabia Bangladesh
163 Tunisia Dominica Argentina
164 Croatia Haiti Niger
165 Yemen Puerto Rico Palestine
166 Bahamas, The Martinique Reunion
167 Georgia Iraq San Marino
168 Greece Guatemala Jamaica
169 Jersey Honduras Iran
170 South Africa El Salvador Serbia and Montenegro
171 Montenegro Turkmenistan France
172 Tuvalu Luxembourg Iceland
173 Mauritania Solomon Islands Guadeloupe
174 Bolivia Croatia Egypt
175 Malta Brazil Mali
176 Germany Monaco Burma (Myanmar)
177 Mexico Ireland Serbia
178 Saudi Arabia Netherlands Antilles Gambia, The
179 Turkey Guadeloupe Paraguay
180 Morocco Antigua and Barbuda Kosovo
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Ranking of countries by religious polarization (High to Low)
Ranks rpol1 rpol2 rpol3
181 Somalia Ukraine Jordan
182 Finland Nicaragua Mexico
183 Rwanda Venezuela Tajikistan
184 Serbia and Montenegro Iran Kyrgyzstan
185 Poland Comoros Ecuador
186 Gaza Strip Colombia Colombia
187 Serbia Greece Croatia
188 Tajikistan Tunisia Ireland
189 Cyprus Paraguay Saudi Arabia
190 Russia Samoa Portugal
191 Bulgaria Spain Monaco
192 Egypt Uruguay Andorra
193 Palestine Andorra Djibouti
194 Syria Tajikistan Senegal
195 Kazakhstan Tuvalu Luxembourg
196 Belarus Italy Thailand
197 Iraq Armenia Armenia
198 Belgium South Africa Denmark
199 Monaco Belarus Malta
200 Albania Portugal Cape Verde
201 Reunion Yemen Venezuela
202 Cape Verde Uzbekistan Libya
203 Spain Marshall Islands Mayotte
204 Luxembourg Malta Cambodia
205 Djibouti Afghanistan Tuvalu
206 Italy Romania Turkmenistan
207 Algeria Mauritania Finland
208 Ukraine Bahamas, The Poland
209 Bosnia and Herzegovina Gaza Strip Comoros
210 Latvia Jersey Greece
211 Yugoslavia Bolivia Tunisia
212 East Timor Mexico Spain
213 Bhutan Algeria Italy
214 West Bank Turkey Uzbekistan
215 Romania Morocco Algeria
216 Kosovo Somalia Mauritania
217 Kyrgyzstan Finland Gaza Strip
218 Turkmenistan Poland Turkey
219 Comoros Cape Verde Morocco
220 Uzbekistan Latvia Somalia
221 Western Sahara Western Sahara Western Sahara
222 Maldives Maldives Maldives
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Table B.17: Ranking of countries by religious intolerance (High to Low)
Rank Country Religious intolerance Govt. Regulation Social regulation Govt. Favouritism
1 Saudi Arabia 3.2583 9.444 9.556 9.278
2 Iran 3.2449 8.796 10 9.389
3 Pakistan 3.1382 8.796 10 8.811
4 Burma (Myanmar) 2.8537 9.259 8.667 8.289
5 Afghanistan 2.8437 7.685 9.778 8.644
6 Egypt 2.7928 8.333 9.556 7.933
7 Iraq 2.6477 7.315 9.333 8.478
8 Uzbekistan 2.5316 8.982 7.778 7.844
9 Kuwait 2.4743 7.87 8.445 7.956
10 Maldives 2.4462 9.722 6 8.611
11 Armenia 2.4217 7.87 7.556 8.678
12 Algeria 2.3786 6.759 8.222 8.867
13 Jordan 2.3708 8.333 6.889 8.667
14 Sudan 2.3605 8.056 9.111 6.389
15 Indonesia 2.3583 6.667 9.556 7.344
16 Comoros 2.2839 8.796 8.445 5.944
17 Belarus 2.2443 7.963 7.778 7.367
18 Georgia 2.2312 7.037 8.445 7.522
19 Bhutan 2.2106 8.056 6.667 8.344
20 Bahrain 2.1737 7.5 6.667 8.733
21 Malaysia 2.1726 7.593 7.556 7.622
22 Qatar 2.1101 8.796 5.111 8.778
23 India 2.1059 6.296 10 5.867
24 Romania 2.0645 6.296 8.222 7.656
25 Greece 2.0601 6.759 7.111 8.4
26 Israel 2.0222 4.815 9.111 7.989
27 Turkmenistan 2.0127 8.982 4.667 8.556
28 Palestine 1.9677 4.352 9.333 7.933
29 Bangladesh 1.9431 7.13 7.333 7.122
30 Mauritania 1.9167 7.778 5.334 8.556
31 Brunei 1.9149 9.445 5.778 6.278
32 Nigeria 1.9040 6.852 7.111 7.456
33 Turkey 1.8874 5.185 9.111 6.867
34 China 1.8830 8.796 5.556 7.044
35 Morocco 1.8495 6.482 7.334 7.3
36 Azerbaijan 1.8170 8.056 8.444 4.2
37 Tunisia 1.7436 5.926 6.445 8.322
38 Russia 1.7297 6.482 7.556 6.4
39 Nepal 1.7056 6.389 9.333 4.356
40 Sri Lanka 1.6337 5.556 9.111 5.1
41 United Arab Emirates 1.6217 6.389 5.556 8.178
42 Cyprus 1.5932 4.63 7.556 7.622
43 Oman 1.5858 6.759 6 7.089
44 Yemen 1.5792 5.926 7.778 5.922
45 Chad 1.5471 6.574 5.556 7.578
46 Somalia 1.5221 7.222 8 3.989
47 Yugoslavia 1.4264 6.111 5.333 7.667
48 Bulgaria 1.2264 7.5 4 6.622
49 Lebanon 1.1631 5.741 6.667 5.122
50 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.1402 5.833 5.333 6.411
51 Libya 1.1284 6.667 4.222 6.722
52 Syria 1.0031 5.741 6 5.011
53 Ethiopia 0.9920 4.167 6.889 5.611
54 Colombia 0.9720 4.167 4.889 7.767
55 Laos 0.9150 8.889 3.556 3.967
56 Kazakhstan 0.7505 6.574 5.111 3.767
57 Moldova 0.6914 4.445 3.778 7.211
58 Kosovo 0.6853 3.056 6 6.133
59 Singapore 0.6560 7.87 1.778 5.656
60 Eritrea 0.6557 8.148 4.667 2.089
61 Kyrgyzstan 0.6111 6.019 6.445 2.089
62 Vietnam 0.6083 8.241 4 2.489
63 Djibouti 0.5956 5.833 4.445 4.467
64 Ukraine 0.5778 4.722 4.889 5.044
65 Cote d’Ivoire 0.5504 4.259 3.778 6.64453
Ranking of countries by religious religious intolerance (High to Low)
Rank Country Religious intolerance Govt. Regulation Social regulation Govt. Favouritism
66 Thailand 0.5261 4.815 2.445 7.433
67 Belgium 0.5068 3.148 4 7.333
68 Cuba 0.4870 7.222 4.667 2.156
69 France 0.4650 4.445 4.667 4.978
70 Macedonia 0.4453 5.278 4.667 3.989
71 Argentina 0.4003 2.037 4 7.933
72 Guinea 0.3986 2.315 4.222 7.378
73 Vanuatu 0.3920 1.667 5.111 7.022
74 Serbia and Montenegro 0.3913 2.222 4.667 6.933
75 Germany 0.3905 3.333 4.222 6.256
76 Kenya 0.3398 3.333 4 6.233
77 Austria 0.3385 1.945 4.889 6.689
78 Tajikistan 0.3230 5 5.333 2.867
79 Mongolia 0.3207 5.556 2.889 5.033
80 Croatia 0.2610 1.667 3.778 7.822
81 Tanzania 0.2126 5.185 3.111 4.589
82 Lithuania 0.1507 3.889 2.222 6.633
83 Western Sahara 0.1146 5.278 2.889 4.211
84 Spain 0.1023 1.019 3.556 7.9
85 Italy 0.0904 1.204 4.445 6.633
86 Latvia 0.0879 3.889 2 6.544
87 Mexico 0.0846 3.333 5.556 3.089
88 Liberia 0.0330 3.056 3.556 5.367
89 Korea, North 0.0215 8.889 2 0.889
90 Zimbabwe -0.0040 3.056 2.889 5.922
91 Peru -0.0086 2.778 0.889 8.456
92 Nicaragua -0.0144 0.741 3.778 7.311
93 Venezuela -0.0527 1.204 2.445 8.122
94 Norway -0.1221 1.759 2.889 6.656
95 Hungary -0.1424 1.389 2.667 7.189
96 Central African Republic -0.1571 5.278 3.778 1.733
97 Niger -0.1581 2.5 4.222 4.167
98 Guatemala -0.1633 1.204 4.222 5.511
99 Nauru -0.1732 5.185 3.778 1.744
100 Slovakia -0.1761 1.204 3.111 6.7
101 Iceland -0.2247 0.926 2 7.989
102 Uganda -0.2403 3.889 5.111 1.244
103 Cameroon -0.2864 2.778 4.889 2.422
104 Equatorial Guinea -0.3115 4.259 2 3.989
105 Philippines -0.3207 1.759 4.667 3.567
106 Dominican Republic -0.3207 1.574 1.111 7.789
107 Cambodia -0.3227 2.315 0.222 8
108 Monaco -0.3418 5.185 2.667 2.089
109 Switzerland -0.3469 1.019 2.889 6.222
110 Czech Republic -0.3689 0.185 2.445 7.489
111 Finland -0.3749 1.574 2 6.489
112 Denmark -0.3899 1.759 1.333 6.967
113 Slovenia -0.4111 0.926 4.445 4.211
114 Chile -0.4477 2.222 1.556 5.911
115 East Timor -0.4888 1.667 5.333 2
116 United Kingdom -0.4920 1.204 3.111 4.989
117 Costa Rica -0.5578 1.019 0.889 7.344
118 Ghana -0.5688 2.037 1.778 5.2
119 Poland -0.5769 0 3.556 5.3
120 Netherlands -0.5819 0 3.778 5.022
121 Portugal -0.6084 1.574 0 7.489
122 Mauritius -0.6351 0.556 3.111 4.9
123 Panama -0.6529 1.296 1.333 6.033
124 Bolivia -0.6700 0 0.667 8.067
125 Japan -0.6704 2.315 2.445 3.6
126 Malta -0.7644 0 0 8.311
127 Andorra -0.8143 0.741 0 7.256
128 Haiti -0.8287 0.278 2.445 4.9
129 Canada -0.8677 0.278 1.778 5.444
130 Luxembourg -0.8800 0.185 0 7.48954
Ranking of countries by religious religious intolerance (High to Low)
Rank Country Religious intolerance Govt. Regulation Social regulation Govt. Favouritism
131 Hong Kong -0.9017 1.019 0.667 5.733
132 Saint Lucia -0.9167 1.019 4 1.878
133 Rwanda -0.9295 4.074 1.111 1.844
134 Malawi -0.9339 0 2.889 4.122
135 Congo, Democratic Republic of the -0.9706 3.704 2.889 0
136 Solomon Islands -0.9707 0.556 2.222 4.089
137 San Marino -0.9776 0 0 7.156
138 Fiji -1.0125 0.741 3.556 2.156
139 Swaziland -1.0228 2.963 0.222 3.522
140 Madagascar -1.0508 1.204 0.889 4.478
141 Liechtenstein -1.0595 0.463 0 6.222
142 Tuvalu -1.0987 0.741 3.556 1.689
143 Papua New Guinea -1.1082 0 2.222 3.933
144 Palau -1.1830 0.648 1.778 3.344
145 Honduras -1.2031 1.296 0.222 4.311
146 South Africa -1.2341 0 3.778 1.489
147 Korea, South -1.2461 0.463 0.667 4.456
148 Cape Verde -1.2930 0 0.445 4.944
149 Senegal -1.3079 0 0 5.367
150 Gabon -1.3127 1.759 0 3.478
151 Brazil -1.3158 0.833 3.334 0.667
152 Belize -1.3643 0.278 0 4.767
153 Suriname -1.3921 0 0.667 4.156
154 Zambia -1.4113 0.185 0 4.611
155 Sweden -1.4194 0.278 1.111 3.211
156 Trinidad and Tobago -1.4277 0.833 1.111 2.578
157 Seychelles -1.4434 0 0 4.633
158 Jamaica -1.4979 1.482 2.445 0
159 Gambia, The -1.5163 0.278 0 3.944
160 Tonga -1.5313 1.019 0 3.078
161 Samoa -1.5458 0.37 2.667 0.667
162 Bahamas, The -1.5595 0.463 0.444 3.011
163 Lesotho -1.5787 0 0 3.9
164 Estonia -1.6004 0.278 0.667 2.733
165 El Salvador -1.6384 1.111 0 2.4
166 Grenadine -1.6407 0 2 1.3
167 Angola -1.7055 0.741 1.556 0.667
168 Mozambique -1.7153 1.111 1.556 0.222
169 Sierra Leone -1.7386 0.278 1.556 0.978
170 Australia -1.7492 0.463 2 0.222
171 Paraguay -1.7596 0 1.333 1.411
172 Albania -1.7626 0.463 1.111 1.156
173 New Zealand -1.7703 0 0.222 2.611
174 Dominica -1.8285 0.741 0.222 1.511
175 Guyana -1.8294 0.278 0.445 1.744
176 Ireland -1.8626 0 0.222 2.111
177 Barbados -1.8729 0 0.889 1.3
178 Macau -1.8758 1.296 0.222 0.667
179 Mali -1.8861 0 1.778 0.222
180 Congo, Republic of the -1.9271 0 1.778 0
181 Saint Kitts and Nevis -1.9846 0 1.111 0.444
182 Guinea-Bissau -2.0042 0.556 0.889 0
183 Ecuador -2.0115 0 0 1.556
184 Togo -2.0259 0.556 0 0.889
185 Taiwan -2.0639 0.278 0 0.978
186 Burundi -2.0745 0.463 0.444 0.222
187 Burkina Faso -2.1129 0 0.889 0
188 Uruguay -2.1129 0 0.889 0
189 Botswana -2.1437 0.556 0.222 0
190 Benin -2.1551 0 0 0.778
191 Antigua and Barbuda -2.1629 0.695 0 0
192 Namibia -2.2578 0 0 0.222
193 Sao Tome -2.2578 0 0 0.222
194 Grenada -2.2988 0 0 0
195 Kiribati -2.2988 0 0 0
196 Marshall Islands -2.2988 0 0 0
197 Micronesia -2.2988 0 0 0
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